Matt Yglesias

Coming Around

When you look at the information coming out about the new Iraq SOFA and its timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, it’s worth putting it in the context of this pre-war argument between Bush and Nouri al-Maliki. Here’s a January 2007 account:

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a surprise for President Bush when they sat down with their aides in the Four Seasons Hotel in Amman, Jordan. Firing up a PowerPoint presentation, Maliki and his national security adviser proposed that U.S. troops withdraw to the outskirts of Baghdad and let Iraqis take over security in the strife-torn capital. Maliki said he did not want any more U.S. troops at all, just more authority.

The president listened intently to the unexpected proposal at their Nov. 30 meeting, according to accounts from several administration officials. Bush seemed impressed that Maliki had taken the initiative, but it did not take him long to reject the idea.

Details, of course, differ and there were some problems with Maliki’s proposal from the point of view of operational specifics. But basically back in November 2006, Iraqi political leaders and progressives in the United States alike wanted to see some kind of phased redeployment of American troops out of Iraqi cities and then out of Iraq. Bush, instead, opted for the “surge” strategy and now eighteen months later we’re . . . doing roughly what Maliki wants which is roughly what he wanted 18 months ago which is roughly what progressives have been saying we should do for a log time. To surge proponents, the fact that they are now proposing what we were proposing years ago underscores the success of the surge. That seems a bit curious to me, but if it helps bolster political support for doing the right thing it might not be the worst thing in the world. But still, the proper chronological perspective leaves me wondering what the surge is supposed to have accomplished.

Well over $100 billion has been spent since Maliki’s November 2006 PowerPoint, and lots of America soldiers have been killed or maimed. And now they’re in a position to basically walk through the door that’s been open at least since the midterm elections — one where we leave Iraq not in “defeat” but with a handshake and a pat on the back from the new government, and a determination to cut our losses on an endeavor that never made strategic sense.

The Politics of Iraq in Iraq

It’s natural for Americans in the midst of a Presidential campaign to look at something like the Iraqi SOFA agreement primarily through the lens of American politics. But it’s real political significance is going to be found in Iraqi politics where the U.S. military presence looms much larger as an issue than it does in the United States. In particular, this is undoubtedly a triumph for Nouri al-Maliki. He’s managed to continue securing the short-term security benefits of an American military presence, but now without bearing the costs of being a supporter of an unpopular long-term presence. And beyond that, Maliki’s now succeeded through politics at doing what al-Sadr and various Sunni resistance groups couldn’t achieve through force of arms — he’s made the Americans promise to go!

The fact that it’s such a huge coup for Maliki, however, also tells us something important about American strategic options. We almost certainly could try to use our leverage to manipulate the situation in favor of staying in Iraq for quite some time now. The agreement contains wiggle-room and of course no agreement is self-enforcing. But we see here that to succeed in Iraqi politics, one needs to take a line against an open-ended American presence. And that means that any effort to stay for the long term will have a certain pushing-the-boulder-uphill quality to it. The United States is probably strong enough to prevent ourselves from being flattened, but we’re always going to be working against the natural contours of the situation and probably earning ourselves more new enemies than new friends.

One Month Later

I just got an email from an advocacy group about what they rightly term “The Elephant Still Very Much in the Room” — the fact that it was one month ago today that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said he wanted the United States to negotiate a timetable for withdrawing forces from Iraq that would have its endpoint somewhere in 2010. As readers will be aware, I favored taking steps along those lines before Maliki ever said he did and still think that would be the right thing to do even if Maliki were saying he wants an open-ended American presence. But I simply do not understand how the anti-timetable argument stays viable in the face of that particular turn in Iraqi politics, especially because Maliki’s main domestic opponents tend to be even firmer on their desire for an American withdrawal.

In a sane world, Maliki’s call would have transformed the Iraq debate in U.S. politics. But in part because it’s not a sane world and in part because of, I guess, tactical failures on the part of Democratic Party politicians it doesn’t seem to have done so yet. But really it was a huge deal that got some coverage at the time but still hasn’t had the sort of profound impact it deserves.