Matt Yglesias

Rooting for the Mediocre

I’m reading Bill Simmons’ The Book of Basketball: The NBA According to The Sports Guy. It’s a lot of fun, and something most NBA fans should enjoy, albeit full of analytical claims I disagree with. One of the most interesting of those claims is a kind of meta-claim he makes near the beginning of the book attributing to himself extra-normal insight from his youth spent as a Celtics fan. It was from watching the truly great teams like the Celtics and the truly great players like Larry Bird that you come to really understand the game since those are the guys who, themselves, understand the game best.

I think this is kind of backwards. You sentimentalize teams you root for, and if you root for a team that’s really good—the Celtics or the Lakers or the Yankees (or the Canadiens?)—you wind up sentimentalizing success. And since the point of a sports competition is to win the games, sentimentalizing success gets people extremely confused. Thus we wind up hearing an awful lot in the book about “character” and how you need good character guys to win. If you’re a Celtics fan, this probably makes a lot of emotional success. The Spurs succeeded in the 2000s because of their great character guys. They were good people. Which means that the Celtics won all those championships because they were such good people. But of course I don’t want to say that the Knicks teams I rooted for in the nineties lost because of “bad character.” So more prosaic ideas come to mind—for example, by the time the team peaked Patrick Ewing was already on the old side and even at peak Ewing, though very good, was never the top big man in the association.

I think common sense is that you understand a sport by watching the best teams play it without having a strong rooting interest. Just watching, relatively dispassionately, to see the best athletes in the world go at it. To wax poetic you need to be “the listener who listens in the snow, / And, nothing himself, beholds / Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.” Otherwise you get too hung up on the idea that the ‘86 Celtics were better than the ‘96 Bulls (something that all and only people from Boston seem to think) and start twisting your whole worldview around to accommodate that conclusion.

Caron Butler Injured

With Caron Butler needing to leave Friday night’s game after an injury, Brendan Haywood told The Washington Post: “I hope he bounces back and is back quickly. Sometimes it’s frustrating, feels like we’re cursed.”

But are the Wizards cursed or do they have a sub-par medical/training staff? There seems to be very little attention paid to that kind of issue. But the conventional wisdom is that the Phoenix trainers are unusually good, so doesn’t it make sense that some would be unusually bad. Wizards players not only get hurt a lot (which happens to everyone) but seem to take a very long time to recover.

Early Results Making Me Look Ridiculous

I don’t think all that highly of my abilities as a sports prognosticator, but I really did think it would take more than two days of action for my NBA predictions to start looking foolish. But I said Cleveland would be the best team in the league and even though I think Boston will be very good thought Cleveland and Orlando would both be better. This theory took a hit when Boston beat Cleveland on opening night. But one game is one game. Then came last night. Boston thrashed a weak Charlotte Bobcats team while the James Gang went and . . . lost to Toronto. Basically nobody except Shaq on Cleveland shot a good percent. LeBron put up a triple-double and took enough free throws (although he shot these with a bad percentage, too) to make the overall scoring pretty efficient, but everyone else stank. And since when is Andrea Bargnani good?

Oh well. Frankly, I don’t much care for the Cavs so I’d be happy for them to turn out to be surprisingly bad. But I just don’t see how this personnel could fail.

Minimax Strategies in Professional Sports

Probably the clearest and most obvious difference between Freakonomics and the sequel is that in the original book, Dubner & Levitt were writing about Steven Levitt’s actual research. People like this research! He won important prizes for it. And not only is the research mathematically sophisticated and prize-worthy, it’s often about quirky, interesting subjects. The sequel, by contrast, has basically nothing to do with Levitt’s research. They just decided to deploy the brand to help sell copies of what’s really just a lot of third-rate political punditry. Interestingly, though, Levitt’s still doing the kind of work that made him famous in the first place.

For an example, check out this recent paper “Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major League Baseball and the National Football League”:

In the perfect world of game theory, two players locked in a zero-sum contest always make rational choices. They opt for the “minimax” solution — the set of plays that minimizes their maximum possible loss – and their play selection does not follow a predictable pattern that might give their opponent an edge. But minimax predictions typically have not fared well in lab experiments. And real-world studies, while more supportive, have often used small samples.

Now a new study, Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major League Baseball and the National Football League (NBER Working Paper No. 15347), looks at two of the biggest high-stakes examples of zero-sum contests: pitch selection in Major League Baseball and play-calling in the National Football League. Authors Kenneth Kovash and Steven Levitt find that: “Pitchers appear to throw too many fastballs; football teams pass less than they should.” They also find that the selection of pitches or plays is too predictable. The researchers conclude that “correcting these decisionmaking errors could be worth as many as two additional victories a year to a Major League Baseball franchise and more than a half win per season for a professional football team.”

Kovash and Levitt examine all Major League pitches – more than 3 million of them — during the regular seasons from 2002 to 2006 (excluding extra innings). They categorize them as fastballs, curveballs, sliders, or changeups. They measure the outcome of each pitch using the sum of the batter’s on-base percentage and slugging percentage (a measure they label OPS) and they determine that fastballs lead to a slightly higher OPS than other types of pitches.

That’s interesting! With the world mired in the most serious recession in decades, arguably not the most important subject for economists to be focused on. But still interesting. And it suggests additional research issues. Are pitchers and managers just making a mistake in throwing too many fastballs? Or is it maybe that for biomechanical reasons most pitchers can’t throw the optimal number of breaking balls without wrecking their arms?

Has “Moneyball” Failed, Or Succeeded?

I don’t really follow baseball in enough detail to know for sure if he’s wrong, but this Buzz Bissinger argument is wildly unconvincing:

Whatever happens in the National League and American League Championship series unfolding over the next week or so, one outcome has already been decided–the effective end of the theories of Moneyball as a viable way to build a playoff-caliber baseball team when you don’t have the money. That no doubt sounds like heresy to the millions who embraced Michael Lewis’s 2003 book, but all you need to do is keep in mind one number this postseason: 528,620,438. That’s the amount of money in payroll spent this season by the teams still in it–the New York Yankees, the Los Angeles Angels, the Philadelphia Phillies, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. Moneyball? You bet it’s Moneyball, true Moneyball, like it always has been in baseball and always will be.

Bissinger goes on to diss Billy Beane across various modalities. But my impression watching from afar is that recent developments in baseball largely vindicate Beane’s work. Obviously, having a bigger payroll to work with is helpful to a general manager. But for a while, detailed attention to statistical work allowed Beane to exploit massive market inefficiencies and put together high-quality, low-payroll teams. But then other people noticed. Michael Lewis wrote a bestselling book about it! So the insights spread, and there are fewer inefficiencies to take care of. If it had somehow been possible to copyright on base percentage and force everyone else to keep relying on batting average, that would have been nice for the early adopters. But it’s not, and the broad outlines of statistical analysis of baseball performance are now pretty widely understood.

The Portland Offense

John Hollinger explains how last year’s Trailblazers put together one of the best offenses in the league:

The Blazers succeeded with the unusual style that Nate McMillan imported from Seattle. His teams have a unique signature — they regularly rank among the league leaders in offensive efficiency and offensive rebound rate while simultaneously finishing among the league’s slowest-paced teams. Most people think of offensive juggernauts as wild run-and-gun outfits, but the Blazers succeeded with half-court execution and second shots much as McMillan’s outfits with the Sonics did.

Portland played the league’s second-slowest pace, averaging only 89.3 trips per side, and that both muted the players’ averages and obscured how devastating they were offensively. The Blazers were deadly efficient, averaging 110.3 points per 100 possessions — ranking second only to Phoenix in offensive efficiency. Despite a lack of brand-name players, they placed ahead of both the Lakers and Cleveland.

People tend not to believe that Portland had a great offense last year. This is in part because the slow pace led to low per game totals, but also because of the perception that they lack effective offensive players beyond Brandon Roy. This in turn stems in part from the quirk whereby people tend to think of put-backs and such as a kind of second-class scoring. The reality, however, is that grabbing offensive rebounds that lead to easy points is a way of putting points on the board that count toward the final tally. “Believe it or not,” Hollinger writes “they did it while barely shooting better than the league average.” But the minimized turnovers and maximized offensive rebounds and that got the job done.

Who Wants the Olympics?

New York Times article about the Obama administration’s involvement in Chicago’s 2016 Olympic bid once again reminds me of how crazy all the Olympic-related lobbying seems. Is there any reason to think these events are actually beneficial? The main sense in which you can imagine a city being made better off by hosting an Olympics is that the hosting duties may cause it to invest in some useful infrastructure that pays off. But if that’s the case the infrastructure investments would have paid off even if there had been no Olympics. The name of the game is to identify useful infrastructure opportunities and build what’s worth building. If anything, pegging the investments to a one-off multination sporting event seems likely to cloud thinking about what is and isn’t truly needed.

This paper is skeptical of the Olympics. This paper sees a summer Olympics announcement giving a sharp short-term boost to stock prices. I take that as evidence that stock market participants are behaving irrationally, but if you think irrational capital market behavior is impossible then I guess that counts as evidence that hosting the games is beneficial.

Shocking Revelation

Does Barack Obama really not know that NFL players are subjected to a salary cap?

Forgot About Jameer

Jameer Nelson (cc photo by Keith Allison)

According to ESPN “At the moment, the big issue in evaluating the Magic seems to be what you think of Hedo Turkoglu and Vince Carter” and their experts put Orlando in distant third place in terms of who’s most likely to win the East.

This strikes me as much less relevant than the return of Jameer Nelson. In 42 games last year, Nelson averaged 31.2 points per game on a very efficient .612 TS% and had a 6.2 percent rebound rate. That’s really good. But he missed the second half of the season and most of the playoffs and then didn’t play well when he did get back in. But if you can add guy like pre-injury Nelson to your team, then you’re looking at a dramatic improvement. Can they? I have no idea. Nelson never played that well before, and maybe he’ll never reach those heights again. Then again, he was only 26 last season, maybe he’ll play better than he did and do it for 82 games. That’d be a great team. But if not, then not.

The Case for the Trailblazers

(cc photo by Keith Allison)

Eli Lake and I agree that the Portland Trailblazers are the only team that could beat the Lakers in the Western Conference in the coming NBA season. The main reason for this, as I see it, is that basically it’s extremely unlikely that anyone can beat the Lakers—they’re really good. For another team to be better, something weird would have to happen. And Portland is basically the best chance for that to happen.

Brandon Roy is 25 years old; LaMarcus Aldridge, Rudy Fernandez, and Travis Outlaw are 24, Greg Oden is 21, Nicolas Batum is 20. That’s six rotation players who are young enough that it’s plausible to imagine them taking a substantial step forward. And if four or five of them do take simultaneous substantial steps forward, then the team is going to be much better. And it’ll be a much better version of a team that was already very good. Notwithstanding their poor playoff performance, last year’s Blazers has the second best point differential in the West. Now is it likely that four or five of those six guys will all take simultaneous substantial steps forward while veteran guys like Joe Pryzbilla and Andre Miller stay level? No, it’s not especially likely. That’d be a stroke of good luck.

But it does seem to me to be within the realm of possibility. And it seems a lot more plausible to me than the idea that Tim Duncan and Manu Ginobili are going to start playing better in their thirties.

Rubio to Barcelona

DKV Joventut’s teen sensation Ricky Rubio will be traded to FC Barcelona rather than joining the Minnesota Timberwolves as the fifth pick in the 2009 NBA Draft. This is mostly being spun as a bad thing for the ‘wolves and possibly even a tactical error by Minnesota. One factor in Rubio’s decision to stay in Spain is that the bill for buying out his contract with Joventut would have been prohibitively expensive. Thus Bill Simmons speculates that Rubio would have paid for the buyout to join a bigger market team where he could have earned more endorsement bucks and thus afforded the buyout: “Rubio needed big market endorsement $$$ to buy out other deal. LA-NY-Chi-Hou-etc. Minny couldn’t work. Kahn messed up. Shoulda flipped him.”

I think this whole line of thought is a mistake. Minnesota benefits from Rubio’s decisions. In general, basketball players are considerably better at 20 than at 18. Thus, in general you’d rather draft 20 year-old players rather than 18 year-old players. The problem, however, is that players with obvious promise enter the draft at 18 so unless you want to pass up on tons of talented guys, you often need to draft teenagers. Under the circumstances, for your teen draft pick to decide he wants to spend two years getting bigger and stronger while honing his skills in one of the world’s top leagues is a good thing. Maybe over the next two seasons Rubio will prove to be a bust, in which case no loss for Minnesota. Or maybe he’ll play well, in which case he’ll come to Minnesota in 2011, and the Timberwolves will get to have the 20, 21, and 22 year-old versions of Rubio on their roster for the rookie salary scale.

Football Stadiums Belong in the Suburbs

There is absolutely no good reason I can think of to try to tempt the Washington Redskins to move to some kind of new stadium located inside the District of Columbia. I love football, I love DC, and I love urbanism. But the NFL season only has 16 games. Eight of those games are on the road. That means you’re talking about a facility that’s going to be without an audience on over 95 percent of possible days. That means the facility can’t possibly be anchoring a neighborhood. On the overwhelming majority of occasions you’re talking about a giant empty space.

A baseball stadium or a basketball/hockey arena are used frequently enough to be perfectly viable elements of an urban neighborhood. Nevertheless, the tendency is for governments to subsidize their construction to a degree that goes far beyond what can be justified. But a football stadium just doesn’t work, it’s a hugely inefficient use of land, and thus ought to be exactly where FedEx Field currently is—a pretty peripheral area in the suburbs. Urban land should be used intensively, and the only way for a football stadium to be an intensive land use is to be one of those combo football/baseball stadiums that have fallen out of fashion and nobody wants to use.

The ideal thing for DC to do with the space currently occupied by RFK Stadium and RFK-affiliated parking lots is to put up lots of buildings where people can live and shop and some kind of park for them to enjoy. It’s land near a metro station and would make a nice fairly dense mixed use community that brought some extra amenities to the surrounding neighborhood.

Ricky Rubio’s Buyout

Ricky Rubio (wikimedia)

The Minnesota Timberwolves continue to have trouble bringing their draft pick Ricky Rubio over from Spain. Not, as it initially seemed, because Rubio doesn’t want to go to the Twin Cities. Rather the issue is that Rubio’s contract with DKV Joventut Badalona involves a $6.6 million buyout and the Timberwolves “can only contribute $500,000 toward the buyout under NBA rules, which handicaps their ability to convince an 18-year-old kid who made just $97,000 to make a huge financial commitment to chase his dream in the league.”

One thing that strikes me is that this seems like a scenario in which we could use some financial innovation. I would say that loaning Rubio $6.1 million to complete the buyout and let him come to the NBA is an investment that’s likely to pay off. He could raise the money by selling “Rubio bonds” that pay out a fixed percentage of his NBA earnings over the next ten years. If he turns into a star, you’ll win big. If he turns into a bust, you’ll lose a lot of your investment. I’d buy one. And actually buyouts aside this seems like a device that could be popular for a lot of young players. Promising rookies could sell bonds bring future income into the present and also to hinge against the possibility (*cough* Greg Oden *cough*) that injuries will prevent them from living up to their hype.

The other thing is that once you ignore the principle-agent problem facing Minnesota’s managers, it’s not clear to me that resolving this issue is really in the Timberwolves’ interest. Rubio “has two years remaining on his contract” and is 18 years old. 20 year-old basketball players are almost always better than 18 year-old basketball players. If Rubio doesn’t buy out his contract, Minnesota will still have his draft rights, will still be able to bring him to the United States, and will still be able to pay him a rookie scale contract. But they’ll be paying for what is, in effect, a better player while some Spanish team needs to finance his further development.

Leverage in the NBA

$14.2 million in 2009-10 plus an eight percent raise the next year.

John Hollinger explains:

Allow me to explain. The entire guiding principle of most cap-related decisions in the past two decades is that the cap will almost always go up and sure as heck won’t go down. It’s embedded in the contracts, too, most of which contain either 8 percent or 10.5 percent annual raises. Thus teams feel safe gambling on a $5 million player. If they’re wrong, the cap will effectively erase the mistake in a season or two by continually rising.

In the current environment, however, some teams are going to be completely whipsawed by a cap that goes down just as their salaries go up. Clubs that have several players with long-term deals could be well under the tax threshold in 2009-10, and then be well over it in 2010-11 with more or less the same players. This is a real threat for the Philadelphia 76ers and Indiana in particular, and it could grab several other teams depending on what transpires in the coming months.

Since the salary cap and the luxury tax threshold in the NBA are both pegged to revenue, and since teams have a limited capacity (but there is some capacity) to reduce the number of players they field, average salaries need to go down. But because contracts are usually guaranteed, and most players have large raises written into their contracts, the decline in salaries is going to need to be borne by a relatively small number of players. Which means, basically, that any team with the financial resources to be hiring next offseason is going to be able to take advantage of incredibly employer-friendly labor market conditions.

Relatedly, right now the Miami Heat have only Dwayne Wade under contract for 2010-11. In other words, Pat Riley is in pretty good shape.

The Evils of the Maximum Salary

LeBron James (wikimedia)

Dave Berri’s list of the most underpaid NBA players relies on his controversial “wins produced” theory so naturally most fans are going to disagree with it. At the same time, looking at his top two guys—Chris Paul and LeBron James—I don’t think anyone is going to disagree that these are excellent players. Nor will anyone disagree that Paul could easily secure more than his current 2008-2009 salary of $4,574,189 or that James could secure more than $14,410,581 on an open market.

And it seems to me that these kind of phenomena relating to the rookie scale and, in particular, the cap on how much you can pay an individual player are an under-discussed source of competitive imbalance in the NBA. In a world with unconstrained bidding on individual players, even if you paired with it a team salary cap, potential employers of top-flight talent would face a real choice. Of course you’d like to have James or Paul on your team, but do you really want to pay what they’re worth? The current rules essentially guarantee that those guys will be underpaid, meaning that signing them for “the max” is a no-brainer. But in an open market, you’d have to pay LeBron so much that it would seriously undermine your ability to sign other good players.

Under the circumstances the only way for a GM to build a great team would be to genuinely identify undervalued talent, not just luck into possession of a super-star who’s worth more than anyone is allowed to pay him.

Blazers Bid for Andre Miller

Looks like the Portland Trailblazers are going to put in a bid for the services of Andre Miller. It makes sense insofar as point guard seems to be their weakest position. But how much would Miller help the team?

Based on this it looks like he does help. But the upgrade from Steve Blake looks pretty marginal. And Miller’s not the kind of skilled long-range shooter who’d help space the floor for Brandon Roy. So this would be a useful pickup but probably not all that useful.

Chris Bosh Laughs Off Idea of Signing With New York Knicks

Not bound for NYC (wikimedia)

You can read the whole tawdry tale here. It seems to me that the big problem with the Knicks’ dreams of scoring a top-notch free agent is the existence of the Miami Heat.

The Collective Bargaining Agreements gives guys like Bosh a pretty strong incentive to resign with the teams that already employ them. But if you’re not going to do that, then if you have responsible people working for you (admittedly an open question) they’re going to point out to you that a contract in Miami will result in substantially more after-tax income than an identical column in New York. And Miami has Dwyane Wade and basically nothing else on the books for the summer of 2010. Combine that with the fact that Pat Riley, loathesome as he is, and Heat management have some kind of track record of success, and you can see that looking like a very appealing options. The Knicks, to put it politely, have no such track record. It’s true that there’s some marketing advantage to being in New York City, but the biggest marketing edge of all is contending for championships and Miami seems like a better place to do that.

Magic Match Gortat Offer

In a rather unexpected move, the Orlando Magic decided to match the Dallas Mavericks’ five-year, $34 million contract offer in order to keep their backup center. Orlando was put in a tough place by Dallas’ offer—that seemed like it was more money than it was worth it to them to pay Gortat, but also that losing Gortat would hurt the team in a way that there was no obvious way to recover from.

The flipside is that resigning Gortat leaves them with the reverse problem. The guy’s numbers were good enough last year to suggest that he’s worth this kind of money to someone but since the Magic already have Dwight Howard, Gortat has limited minutes to fill. Maybe the thought is that they should play a Howard-Gortat “twin towers” lineup someone more often. Might be a good idea. At any rate, after trading for Vince Carter—which I think was a somewhat questionable move—the Magic seem committed to trying to win a championship next year, and that means resigning Gortat.

Brock Lesnar’s Edge

Apparently Freddie from the League of Ordinary Gentlemen is desperate for a coveted Matthew Yglesias link so let me say that though I don’t follow UFC I did find this post very interesting:

Now the UFC’s heavyweight division spans from 207-265 pounds. Which means the absolute biggest you can be on the day of a weigh in is 265– and it just so happens that Brock Lesnar can get down to just about 265 exactly. As most fighters who have to cut to make weight do, he then proceeds to gain a bunch of weight before fight night, and it’s commonly said that Lesnar may weigh as much as 290 or more when he actually fights. Lesnar is just about as big of a human as you can get in the UFC. Meanwhile, almost anyone else in the heavyweight division has no need to cut, so they weigh in at their fight weight. So when he goes to fight a guy like Frank Mir, who he fought tonight and weighed in at 245, he has a huge size advantage of 45 pounds. When he fought Randy Couture, Lesnar probably outweighed him on the order of 65 pounds or more. Who do you suppose would win in a fight between a 145-pound featherweight and a 205-pound light heavyweight?

There are bigger fighters than Lesnar. The problem is there are very few who are just the right size, big enough to pose a threat to Lesnar but capable of cutting to 265. And it amounts to an enormous structural advantage for Lesnar. I don’t think that Bob Sapp is a great fighter by any means. But I think that Bob Sapp could manhandle Brock Lesnar. There’s just no way Sapp could ever get down to 265 pounds. That’s true of a lot of opponents, I think.

Elsewhere on the blog, William Brafford sides with the Whigs of the 1830s and 1840s against the Jacksonian Democrats. I’m with him. I think it’s interesting, however, that people’s instincts about modern-day politics do a very poor job of tracking their instincts about these antebellum partisan debates. You see a lot of modern-day progressives who seem to find much to admire in Jackson’s vision. To me, though, it’s important not to let the fact that there’s a charming TMBG song about James K Polk distract from the basic reality that he was playing for the bad guys.

NBA Salaries in Context

Shockingly enough, NBA officials are hoping to take advantage of the expiration of the current collective bargaining agreement to pay the players less money:

For all the tough talk about raising the age limit to 20, eliminating 10.5 percent annual pay raises and lowering the maximum length of contracts, the real meat of the discussions is expected to be centered around the division of revenues and the percent the players are getting: 57, which is nearly 9 percentage points more than they were allocated when the salary cap was instituted in the 1980s.

What to make of that 57 percent? Well, to put it in context, consider the Kaiser Family Foundation’s report on the evolution of compensation in recent decades in the United States:

Total compensation as a share of GDP is denoted by the topmost line and is a fairly stable over the period, ranging from about 56 percent to 59 percent. Although wages are consistently the largest component of worker compensation, the shares paid to employees for health benefits and other fringe benefits/payroll taxes have increased as a share of GDP, while the amount paid as wages has fallen. Health benefit costs have increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1960 to 4.1 percent in 2006. Fringe benefits other than health care and payroll taxes have also increased over this period, ranging from 3.8 percent of GDP in 1960 to 6.7 percent in 2006.

In other words, a 57 percent share of revenue going to the players is pretty much in line with the historically determined rate of employee compensation as an overall share of the economy. Of course owners do have labor costs beyond the players (coaches, guys who sell pretzels, etc.). But the 57 percent in question here is a percent of “basketball-related income” which does not include the full range of income sources available to owners:

Basketball-related income includes most basketball revenue, but it excludes several important income sources. For instance, basketball-related income does not include naming rights (often several million dollars per year), licensing and sponsorship income (around $300 million per year), 60 percent of both arena signs and luxury box income, and parts of related-party income.

To make a long story short, NBA players earn a lot of money because (a) NBA franchises have a lot of revenue and (b) there aren’t very many NBA players (usually 12 players on a roster instead of 25 on a baseball team or hundreds of employees at a given Wal-Mart) so the money is concentrated in a few hands. But I don’t see any evidence that they’re earning an unusually large slice of the pie relative to any other industry.

Maybe Allen Iverson Just Isn’t Very Good

Teams keep getting better when the Answer leaves (wikimedia)

Sports Illustrated’s Steve Aschburner wonders why we don’t see Allen Iverson signing on for a supporting role on a contending team:

Allen Iverson ought to be next. The ‘01 MVP, nine-time All-Star and four-time scoring leader has the individual résumé for such a move. He presumably has the financial wherewithal to take the requisite pay cut after 13 seasons of superstar wages, including the $76.7 million extension he landed in ‘03 and the “lifetime” endorsement deal (whatever that means) he signed with Reebok in ‘01. He even has the game for it — think instant offense, sixth man, the sort of player a coach could turn loose off the bench to mess with the opponents’ second unit almost at will. At 34, Iverson still is quick enough, slippery enough and crafty enough to change games.

He concludes that “What he doesn’t have, though, is the attitude for it.”

Alternatively, maybe after trading Iverson for Andre Miller made Philadelphia better and then trading Iverson for Chauncey Billups made Denver better, teams are starting to figure out what some people have been saying for a while: Allen Iverson isn’t a very good basketball player. He scores a lot because he shoots a lot, but he’s turnover-prone and subpar at rebounding. And the fact that in order for Iverson to be effective he needs to be paired with a point guard who’s big and strong enough to guard opposing two guards is a major downside.

Millsap, Lee, and Aldridge

With Paul Millsap and David Lee still available in restricted free agency, and the Portland Trailblazers still possessing cap room, the time comes to ask the question: Aren’t those guys better than incumbent Portland power forward LaMarcus Aldridge? I think the answer is yes:

You could make the case that switching to Millsap, who’s an extremely low volume shooter, might really leave Portland with missing shots. But last season Lee was scoring almost as much as Aldridge on fewer shots and fewer minutes. And he’s snagging more rebounds on a much higher percentage. I think standing pat this offseason would be a defensible move for Portland, but if they’re going to sign someone I think Lee would help more than the now-off Turkoglu deal ever would have.

Hedo to Toronto

It looks like Hedo Turkoglu’s not going to Portland after all. Instead, he’ll sign with Toronto. I wasn’t in love with the idea of that deal for Portland, so I think this could be for the best. If they can snag Andre Miller on a reasonable contract, that could be better for them. And since there are no other real prospective bidders out there I don’t see why they couldn’t snag Andre Miller on a reasonable contract. I also think Paul Millsap and David Lee, both of whom are on the market, are better than the somewhat overrated LaMarcus Aldridge.

The other option available to them is just to do nothing. The CW is that Portland needs to use its $9 million in cap space because it won’t be available next summer when extensions for Aldridge and Brandon Roy kick in. That’s true, but the possession of cap room during the season would make them a very appealing trade partner for a team that decides it needs to shed salary. Oftentimes the most one-sided deals out there are this in-season salary dumbs (think Pau Gasol to LA or Kevin Garnett to Boston) so being in a position to be the partner in that kind of deal could be very valuable.

Hollinger Makes the Case for Artest

I expressed some doubts as to whether exchanging Trevor Ariza for Ron Artest really makes the Lakers better. John Hollinger makes the case that he is:

At small forward, L.A. mostly needs a floor spacer, and as far as floor-spacing ability goes, Artest is superior to Ariza — he shot 39.9 percent on 3s last season, Ariza 31.9 percent. [...] Overall, Artest isn’t as efficient as Ariza offensively because he tends to force terrible shots, but that’s likely to be less of a problem in a system in which he’s the fourth option behind Kobe Bryant, Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum. Additionally, he’s a good passer who might see his assist rate bump significantly in L.A.

Basically the conjecture here is that rather than play in LA as he played in Houston (a guy who shoots more than Ariza, but does so less efficiently), Artest will start playing like a different guy who shoots less, but takes most of his shots in the form of highly efficient three pointers. Hollinger also says that Artest’s inferiority as a rebounder will be compensated for by his superiority as an on-the-ball defender.

Neither argument strikes me as clearly wrong, but I don’t think either is clearly correct. At the end of the day, the facts that Ariza is younger and less crazy seem like controlling tie-breakers to me.

The Tangible Value of Jason Kidd

Jason Kidd (wikimedia)

Rick Bucher writes about the enduring value of Jason Kidd:

“His value is in the intangibles now as much as anything,” one Western Conference scouting director says. “He gets guys to play at a higher level. He’s played in the Finals; he’s won gold medals. He was really the guy that set the tone last summer in Beijing.”

I think this is an Andris Biedrins case—a player who is in fact valuable in ways that can be fairly easily quantified, and who’s generally recognized to be valuable, but whose value people insist on making a mystery out of.

Kidd is a well-known triple-double machine because he’s an extraordinary rebounder for a point guard. And even though last year’s 9.9 rebound rate is quite a bit down from the peak of his career, it’s still very good. What’s more, in the past few seasons he’s become an effective three point shooter. Consequently, the .522 TS% he put up last year in Dallas was actually the best of his career. This has partially offset the fact that his assist ratio seems to be on the decline.

The point is that the numbers basically tell the tale you’d expect. Kidd is valuable because he’s still putting up the numbers of a valuable player. He’s also, overall, on the decline at age 36. So any team that signs him will, of course, be worried about further declines in his performance level. He’s also at a point where he probably can’t guard many of the league’s quick point guards, so in some contexts putting him on the floor could create major matchup problems. But I don’t think intangibles have a great deal to do with it.