
Barack Obama’s visit to Cairo seems to be sparking a depressing quantity of nonsense criticism, but I think real questions are hanging over the long-run import of this kind of outreach. In that spirit, I would add my voice to what Matt Duss says here and what Michael Cohen and Brian Katulis say here, namely that a meaningful dialogue with the population in Egypt and neighboring countries requires a willingness to engage with the Islamist political movements that are, in most such places, the main source of political opposition.
It would be nice to think that we could cook up a nice crew of friendly, western-style, market-oriented, Israeli-loving, secularist Arabs to take the reigns of power in Arab capitals and spread the gospel of democracy. But you have to deal with societies as they actually exist, and in Egypt that means a society with a large and influential Muslim Brotherhood. The aim should be to move toward a healthier bilateral relationship, where the United States is not involved with actively propping up unpopular regimes or trying to micromanage the domestic politics of foreign countries.

The new Netanyahu-Lieberman government in Israel is going to have some problems in its relationship with the United States. But the bigger immediate problem is going to relate to Israel’s strategically important relationships with other countries in the region. For example, Egypt:
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s diplomatic bombshell Wednesday that Israel was no longer obligated by the Annapolis process, but was committed to the road map, was followed by silence on Thursday as neither Lieberman nor Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s office issued directives to Israeli diplomats about how to explain the new policy abroad. [...] Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit said he would not shake Lieberman’s hand until he retracted previous statements such as the threat to blow up the Aswan Dam and the remark that Mubarak could “go to hell” if he didn’t want to visit Israel. [...] He continued, “I have met with more than one Israeli foreign minister, and I have welcomed them in Egypt. But never before has any of them said anything like what [Lieberman] said against Egypt.”
The United States has recently emerged from an extended period of inept diplomacy. The good news, for us, is that as the world’s largest economy and mightiest military power, we had the luxury of a pretty big margin of error. Israel doesn’t have that luxury. And Lieberman’s rhetorical excesses aside, the fundamental problem of relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey will remain as long as Israel is committed to Bibi Netanyahu’s determination to avoid even contemplating an independent Palestine.

Greg Sanders asks:
One thing I’m wondering about Gaza. If at some point in the future, Egypt goes more democratic and the Muslim Brotherhood gains a role in the government, does a substantially better relationship between Palestinians in Gaza and Egypt become possible?
As you’ve shown via links, the West Bank part of a three state solution is totally unworkable. However, the problems with perhaps getting some sort of protectorate status for Gaza seem to largely center around Mubarak (or any likely dictatorial successor).
A “three-state solution” would entail Gaza being incorporated into Egypt, Israel grabbing and annexing the parts of the West Bank it wants, and Jordan absorbing a rump West Bank and this seems to be the successor fantasy to the “Greater Israel” dreams of yore. With regard to the question, obviously this would depend on the state of the overall Israel-Palestine issue.
I can’t speak from a great wealth of personal experience, but I do think it’s a mistake to look at the Middle East as just a big ol’ sea of generic Arabs who can be shunted from one country to another. Egyptians are aware of Egypt’s distinctly Egyptian history and heritage and Palestinians have a feeling of common nationhood. That said, if you assume a future Palestinian state, it’s natural that Gaza will in some ways be more connected with Egypt (which it’s next to) than to the rest of Palestine. But think of Alaska. Notwithstanding the fact that Alaska shares a border with Canada along with a language and broadly speaking a “culture,” Alaskans are still Americans. And, indeed, as we’ve seen from Sarah Palin they’re capable of manifesting an ugly brand of American nationalism that’s totally incompatible with being Canadian.
An interesting related issue that can only be speculated about is to what degree would we see much closer political integration between Arab states if he had more political democracy. There are efforts, of course, to coordinate Arab policy through fora such as the Arab League. But in practice it’s extremely difficult for authoritarian states to cooperate in a deep way. Constituted as democracies, however, it would be much more plausible to imagine the Arab League turning into something more like an Arab version of an EU-style superstate.