Soviet Ink Spots
I don’t think I agree with the analytical conclusions of this item from the Ghosts of Alexander blog assessing the prospects for “A Hybrid Rumsfeld/Soviet Strategy for Afghanistan.” But it’s worth reading, and this map, originally from Gilles Dorronsoro’s Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present is very interesting in light of apparently ongoing disagreement in policy circles about how many population centers you really need to control to maintain a basic grip on Afghanistan. It shows what portions of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan were under effective government control:
“]![[click on image for larger version]](http://easterncampaign.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/commaf.jpg "commaf 1")
The basic strategy reads pretty clearly off the map. It’s easier to hold cities than the countryside. So you try to put together a string of urbanized areas that leaves you in control of the main ring road through the country, plus via Jalalabad and Kunduz some key routes to the border. But the Soviets couldn’t quite make this work, and some serious portions of the road network remained out of their grasp.
23 Responses to “Soviet Ink Spots”
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November 12th, 2009 at 1:59 pm
1) There is something to the dog that catches the car about this. So, suppose the US does manage to hold all these key urban areas and, I guess, imposes martial law. Then what? How does the exit business work?
2) In statistics we always have a null hypothesis. Why isn’t withdrawal the null hypothesis here? Why do we never justify the occupation vs non-occupation, but rather take occupation as axiomatic?
November 12th, 2009 at 2:01 pm
I wonder how many of the areas that were listed as being under government control actually were. Was control just the difference between ‘you probably won’t die’ and ‘you probably won’t live’, or did it mean green zone levels of safety (for what that’s worth)?
November 12th, 2009 at 2:02 pm
Using whatever the definition that is used for “control” in the diagram, I wonder what an analogous map would look like for the United States today.
Not trying to make a point with, just musing. Perhaps it would be completely and totally shaded in. If the definition of control is “there are no forces here that could deny direct seizure of the territory by government forces if they were to seek to do so,” then it would probably be fully shaded. I wonder what the definition of control in this diagram is.
November 12th, 2009 at 2:02 pm
Countering the IED counter-strategy would be difficult.
November 12th, 2009 at 2:02 pm
It would be interesting to see a similar, honest map regarding the current NATO areas of control.
I suspect it would look very different, and even if we adopted the “Biden plan” would remain so, if for no other reason than the general support NATO has in the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Thus, in the south the map would look quite like it did for the Soviets (with Kandahar and portions of the ring road controlled, and little else), but for the northern two-thirds of the country nearly everything shaded in with only small pockets of insurgency.
November 12th, 2009 at 2:05 pm
Why do we never justify the occupation vs non-occupation, but rather take occupation as axiomatic?
Because of the political costs of accepting defeat. No one even credits the idea that a leader would consider taking those on, so the debate ranges from “continue war” to “expand war.”
November 12th, 2009 at 2:14 pm
Because of the political costs of accepting defeat. No one even credits the idea that a leader would consider taking those on, so the debate ranges from “continue war” to “expand war.”
Ever since Iraq’s WMDs turned out to be a fairy tale, all we’ve been fighting for is the ego of the D.C. establishment which just won’t admit it fucked up bigtime.
November 12th, 2009 at 2:33 pm
1) You either hunt down and kill the fucking enemy or you don’t.
When you retreat behind walls, you give up all initiative and have to wait to see how the enemy is going to surprise you.
You don’t try to hold terrain in a counterinsurgency.
2) There seems to be remarkably fuzzy thinking in the White House. They should focus on the basics: Who is the enemy. What is the best/most efficient way to take care of him?
3) It sounds to me like someone has lost that big Azerbaijan -Georgia -Turkey pipeline to the Russians and now wants to
build an alternative pipeline through Afghanistan in order to make good on Chevron’s $1 Billion plus investments in Caspian Sea Oil.
Except the “Blood for Oil” agenda is temporarily in disfavor so they have to make up a bunch of bullshit to cover their real agendas.
November 12th, 2009 at 2:35 pm
The invasion and conquest of Afghanistan was a horrendous error supported by at least 90% of Americans.
Obama compounded this error when, in a dishonest effort to distinguish himself from the field while retaining macho cred, he decided that Afghanistan was the central front in the War On Terror. He made it his war. He is now hoist upon his own petard.
And he knows just how fickle Americans are.
An American withdrawal will guarantee the return of the Taliban to power.
Fags buried alive under brick rubble!
Uppity women executed in the soccer stadium!
All females banned from education establishments!
Little boys not allowed to fly kites!
And those god awful statues blown to bits!
Oh the humanity!
And after the deaths of so many American boys to defeat Mullah Omar!
Obama well knows how quickly the American public will rally round Dick Cheney when Omar again rules the roost.
Does the Left?
November 12th, 2009 at 3:04 pm
Jesse Says:
November 12th, 2009 at 2:02 pm
It would be interesting to see a similar, honest map regarding the current NATO areas of control.
I suspect it would look very different, and even if we adopted the “Biden plan” would remain so, if for no other reason than the general support NATO has in the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Thus, in the south the map would look quite like it did for the Soviets (with Kandahar and portions of the ring road controlled, and little else), but for the northern two-thirds of the country nearly everything shaded in with only small pockets of insurgency.
================================================
I think you are absolutely correct. People keep forgetting that we really didn’t “invade and conquer” Afghanistan. We came in with relatively few troops and lots of air support to help the Northern Alliance throw the Taliban/Pashtuns out of power. A very different situation from the Soviets in 1979
November 12th, 2009 at 3:18 pm
Great map. I agree with Jesse @5. I would love to see the map with an overlay of our current situation.
It seems to me our priorities lie more to the north and east than the Soviets. Certainly the Pentagon, and India, would love to see several dozen anti-ballistic missile batteries -safely deployed- as near the Pakistan border as possible. No wonder India is beginning to pony up some nation-building money. They are making a down payment on missile defense. Too smart India.
Also, I would love to know what we are doing in the Northeast corner, especially at the end of the land peninsula that stretches directly east -to touch a sliver of China. I believe from a location, there, overlooking the Chinese border, an X-band Radar could identify an object as small as a mouse as far away as Beijing.
November 12th, 2009 at 3:28 pm
Why the hell would you build a relatively fragile object that’s full of flamable liquid in Afghanistan? You’d be better off creating an offshore shell company and building it through Iran and Turkey.
November 12th, 2009 at 3:33 pm
I think you are absolutely correct. People keep forgetting that we really didn’t “invade and conquer” Afghanistan. We came in with relatively few troops and lots of air support to help the Northern Alliance throw the Taliban/Pashtuns out of power. A very different situation from the Soviets in 1979
The Sovs didn’t really invade either.
They got frustrated with their satellite and having picked new leaders only a short time before, they decided to be more hands-on with the next batch.
This, of course, was accompanied by the Sovs’ trademark lack of restraint (Ground) as opposed to our trademark lack of restraint (Air).
However unlike us, they were not accompanied by resounding international approval, which led the already extant Afghan opposition to decide to fight back.
If anything, we “invaded” Afghanistan more properly than the Soviets, in the sense that there was an enemy with real defensive lines, and that actually fought battles when we advanced.
Of course, we used auxillia rather than any of our legio
November 12th, 2009 at 3:59 pm
Greg:
I think you are absolutely correct. People keep forgetting that we really didn’t “invade and conquer” Afghanistan. We came in with relatively few troops and lots of air support to help the Northern Alliance throw the Taliban/Pashtuns out of power. A very different situation from the Soviets in 1979
Greg is very correct on this point. the Soviets came intending to leave within a couple of weeks to install Moscow baked-leader (I think his name was Tariki) and noe thing led to another until they found themselves in the middle of a mess.
I was recently reading a book on the Soviet’s war there, I don’t have exact number handy but they committed something like 150,000-170,000 troops and that level was kept constant throughout the war. Of those a huge amount of troops were either logistics people or tied up defending the Russian’s supply lines or the population centers. The Soviets played a game of essentially holing up in Kabul and keeping their supply line through the Sarang highway open.
The author stated that at any one time, the Soviets only had about 20,000 troops ready for an offensive operation because the factors i mentioned above and the fact that many of their soldiers were unfit for combat or in the hospital.
That being said, the Soviets tried to rely on the communist Afgan army to do fighting for them as much as possible. At the beginning of the Soviet Afgan war, it was down to about 15,000 troops in 1983 due to desertions and mutanies.
By the end of the war, the Soviets had built it up (to their credit) in to an pretty effective fighting force considering the circumstances, but once it didn’t have the Red Army to call in if things got hot, the Afgan Army started to fall apart after the Soviets exited in ‘88-89.
Out of all of the strategies I’ve seen offered, none of them seem very promising. The “clear and hold” strategy seems the most promising but let’s face it, even with committing 40k more troops we wouldn’t have enough people to cover the ground we really need to.
That being said, pulling back into the cities and controlling pockets around strongholds or urban centers is about the worst thing we can do. If we’re going to go that route we mind as just leave right now and let the end game play out for Kharazi and his buddies.
November 12th, 2009 at 5:39 pm
That’s a cool map, and I agree with those above who’d like to see what our map looks like. But this map explains how Charlie Wilson could beat the Russians. They are heavily reliant on supply roads. And supply convoys are sitting ducks. A guy on a horse with an RPG can take out the first few trucks and everyone else is trapped behind them. In the terrain of a mountain pass, the rest of trucks can’t go anywhere. Horses can. And when you have a convoy trapped, a bunch of guys on horses with RPGs can pick them apart with ease. I think the secret to Afghanistan is that you cannot rely on roads. But the alternative is air transport, and that’s really expensive. The Afghans always win eventually, and it’s because it’s too damn expensive for anyone else to win there. And there really is no prize at the end. If you could take Afghanistan, what do you have? Nothing. The Afghans already have that, and so they really have nothing to lose. What are we going to do if we decide we want to just punish them? Bomb their infrastructure? Yeah right. Bombing dirt only moves the dirt around. I’d like to help the Afghans, I really would. But I’m not really sure what we can do.
November 12th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
This is the big difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a land that has very little value. Vietnam is the jewel of Asia. There’s a reason everyone fought over Vietnam, it’s worth it. It has the best rice growing lands in the world. And some really great coastal fishing too. In Afghanistan, it’s always been a buffer zone to control so you keep your real enemy away from you.
November 12th, 2009 at 6:39 pm
What are we going to do if we decide we want to just punish them? Bomb their infrastructure? Yeah right. Bombing dirt only moves the dirt around. I’d like to help the Afghans, I really would. But I’m not really sure what we can do.
Well, the point about being in Afghanistan at this point isn’t about winning anything material or even eliminating a terrorist stronghold. I think our involvement is more about keeping Pakistan stable than anything else.
The Russians want a stable country to put pipelines through, and the Iranians want a stable country so their own Shi’ite rebels won’t find a refuge there.
Until lately, I don’t think that Pakistan didn’t care who if Afghanistan was a mess, they just wanted to keep the Indians out no matter what. I think we’ll see if the Pakistani Army finally wakes up to fact that the Jihadis’ are a direct threat to the Pakistani state.
If the Pakistani Taliban attack on their GHQ (the Pakistani version of the Pentagon) then nothing will. Either Pakistan will seriously change it’s attitude in the next six months or it will continue to be in constant crisis until a final collapse.
November 12th, 2009 at 7:41 pm
If the Pakistani Taliban attack on their GHQ (the Pakistani version of the Pentagon) then nothing will. Either Pakistan will seriously change it’s attitude in the next six months or it will continue to be in constant crisis until a final collapse.
You can’t pull off that kind of attack without the knowledge of the ISI.
The problem is that those very, very, very scary fellows – along with a lot of the army – are actively opposed to many of their colleagues.
November 12th, 2009 at 11:52 pm
You can’t pull off that kind of attack without the knowledge of the ISI.
The problem is that those very, very, very scary fellows – along with a lot of the army – are actively opposed to many of their colleagues.
Agreed.
I don’t know what else to say about it, except that we’re looking at the clusterfuck of the 21st century there. Forget about Iran, this is what we should be really concerned about.
November 13th, 2009 at 3:00 am
The ICOS Group has produced maps of Taliban activity and coalition control:
ICOS Group map of Taliban activity, 2007-2009
One of the things we have it easier than the Sovs is in the north, where there is more substantial support for the coalition. But even that is slipping. Notably, all of the key overland supply routes are in areas where the Taliban operate freely.
November 13th, 2009 at 3:47 am
I was in Paris in 06 to meet with family. On my last day there, I shared a taxi to the airport with a gentleman who’d “just returned from working on the oil pipeline in Afghanistan.” “Oh, there’s an oil pipeline there?”, I said. “Yeah”, was the reply, “it’s Pappy Bush’s.” When I returned to California, I looked up “pipelines Afghanistan” in Google, and yes….Bush 41 was a prime investor even back then! Why don’t you try and draw in the pipeline and which areas we are “protecting”. Bet they’ll match!
November 13th, 2009 at 8:21 pm
Interesting map Lakefxdan. I wonder what’s so exceptional about Sari-el-Pal and Panjshir Provinces. That’s mostly Dari and Uzbek territory. I wonder if that makes a difference?
Are remnants of Shah Massoud (Lion of Panjshir) forces keeping the Taliban out of the Panjshir. Is there anything left of Massoud’s organization?
November 14th, 2009 at 5:57 am
«You either hunt down and kill the fucking enemy or you don’t.»
While holding territory is a loser strategy, the above is only true in part; going back to Clausewitz plus a few updates, victory happens when either:
* The enemy army is destroyed or reduced.
* The enemy army is incapacitated, e.g. by denying it supplies.
* The enemy army no longer has a reason to fight.
It is not thus just killing the enemy. And holding territory *might* achieve indirectly the “denying supplies” bit. But it is usually a fairly expensive way to do it.
The best solution to conflict is “enemy army no longer has a reason to fight”, but in the case of the Afghans their reason to fight is either ideological (e.g. throwing foreigners out of their country) or religious (throwing the infidels out of their country) and those are difficult to deal with.
The usual big issue with the Afghan war is that it started out as a very correct, appropriate war (because the contry was willing to be a base of operations for enemies of the USA and thus NATO), and has suffered from mission drift, some of it seemingly intentional.