Counterinsurgency Needs Civilian Cabilities
Steve Metz has an excellent TNR piece making the case that pious talk aside, we’ve done nothing to actually build the civilian capabilities that all our defense policy planners and political leaders say we need in order to conduct the sort of counterinsurgency operations it’s claimed that we need to do. What to do about it. I’m going, however, to quote the very end of the article where I think he doesn’t lay the conclusions out just right:
There are only two solutions. We could belly up and provide the resources for a serious expeditionary civilian corps. But a few hundred or even a couple of thousand people is not enough. We would need many thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of advisers with linguistic skills and cultural knowledge willing to leave home and live under risky conditions for years at a time. And we are not talking about 20-somethings paid a pittance and fueled by idealism, but skilled professionals demanding serious pay for their expertise and sacrifice. (The difficulty that the State department had convincing even its hardened professionals to volunteer for duty in Iraq showed what a challenge this is.) Of course, if the pay is high enough, the experts will come. But, at a time of massive government budget deficits and a persisting national economic crisis, this is simply not in the cards.
What, then, is Plan B? If we are unwilling to pay the price for a serious civilian capability–and admit that foisting the job of development and political assistance on the military is a bad idea–the only option is to alter our basic strategy. We could find a way to thwart Al Qaeda and other terrorists without trying to re-engineer weak states. We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds.
I think the situation is actually much less bleak than Metz makes it out to be. For one thing, the massive government budget deficits and a persisting national economic crisis really shouldn’t be a barrier to doing this. If the things that leading Pentagon officials claim to believe about American national security are true, what we ought to do is draw up a bill of what it would cost to properly finance the civilian side of things and cut that much money from the Defense Department budget in order to pay for it. But of course the Pentagon won’t actually agree to that, which sets up the more realistic option of the Pentagon paying lip service to the need for civilian capabilities while in practice building those capabilities in-house.
That’s not a great idea, but it’ll probably work out okay anyway because there’s really very little reason to believe that “thwart[ing] Al Qaeda and other terrorists without trying to re-engineer weak states” is really all that hard. Al-Qaeda is a very small number of people with what appears to be an extremely limited capacity to damage western interests. What’s more, even on the rare occasions when al-Qaeda achieves tactical success at murdering westerners, there’s no sign these murders do any real damage on a strategic level. It’s not as if the July 2005 bombings in London have displaced the U.K. from its ranks as wealthy, medium-sized country with highly competent armed forces.
14 Responses to “Counterinsurgency Needs Civilian Cabilities”
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October 15th, 2009 at 2:33 pm
cabilities?
Welcome to Costco.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:39 pm
As someone who earns his living negotiating deals, it is obvious that Sen Collins is not negotiating in good faith. She has no intention of voting for health care reform but doesn’t want to say that to her voters in Maine who want reform.
Many moderates from both parties are playing this game.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:41 pm
“But of course the Pentagon won’t actually agree to that…”
I wouldn’t write off Bob Gates so easily — there’s some F-22-esque waste to cut yet, and if you can connect it to national security (or winning a war), support starts to come up.
“It’s not as if the July 2005 bombings in London have displaced the U.K. from its ranks as wealthy, medium-sized country with highly competent armed forces.”
There’s a bit of a difference between an attack by 9/11 and a backpack bomb on the subway (or tube). That AQ can pull off both doesn’t mean they are the same.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:43 pm
so essentially Matt is willing to roll the dice that Al Qaeda isn’t able to come up with another attack on the scale of 9/11.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:43 pm
MY “What’s more, even on the rare occasions when al-Qaeda achieves tactical success at murdering westerners, there’s no sign these murders do any real damage on a strategic level.”
They did knock Spain out of the Coalition of the Willing, which reduced our powerful coalition down to the United States, the UK, and mighty East Timor vs Al Qaeda. They evened up the odds, in other words.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:54 pm
In a bold effort to illustrate the crisis of literacy in America, jc writes: “so essentially Matt is willing to roll the dice that Al Qaeda isn’t able to come up with another attack on the scale of 9/11.”
No, essentially Matt is willing to roll the dice that conducting a low-level war against Al-Qaeda is just as effective a policy for preventing attacks on the scale of 9/11 as propping up an inept, corrupt, heroin-trafficking misogynist regime and sending tens of thousands of American troops to fight to a stalemate against their less inept, totalitarian, heroin-trafficking even-more-misogynist opposition.
Personally, I think Matt is probably being too charitable to the people who want to pursue an undermanned, ill-fated COIN strategy to support the Karzai kleptocracy.
October 15th, 2009 at 2:57 pm
There is a guy out there, a fast talking cocky guy, who believes in splitting the Defense Department in two. Make half the department fast response warriors and the other half civilian nations builders. He is not a dove, but he is not a hawk either. His presentations are sharp and convincing.
Anyone know who I’m talking about? I lost a folder the contained all my links to him, and I can’t figure out how to google him back into my computer.
October 15th, 2009 at 3:06 pm
We definitely need some hard core civillian capabilities to counter AQ in Afghanistan. Just look at AQ’s awesome civilian capabilities; they understand where to put their resources. Just the other day I ran into an AQ social worker – he promised to improve my drinking water and utilities. Awesome! I’m sold! Imagine how much ground we’ll regain if we just double down on delivering aid and comfort. People eat that shit up! We need more grad students with an understanding of Afghanistan’s culture and the ability to manage relief projects in impoverished communities, and fewer knuckle dragging killers. The latter is so passe, and the reason why AQ and the Taliban have shifted their focus away from terror. It just doesn’t work!
October 15th, 2009 at 3:16 pm
He’s right. The shorter version is the only way to control Afghanistan is to colonize it.
October 15th, 2009 at 4:05 pm
The next government that controls all the territory inside Afghanistan’s borders will be the first. This is a ‘least developed country’, meaning it has basically no resources to make a nation building adventure worth while or sustainable.
The article MY quotes basically says we need to airlift an educated middle class over to Afghanistan since they’ll probably never have one of their own.
That said, we can’t just walk away from this place after 9-11, the Iraq war and all the disasters of this decade. I’m not getting why we can’t control a little part of Afghanistan and maybe launch terrorist attacks of our own against the Taliban and AQ. If it’s a ’success’ or a ‘win’ for them when they blow up a school or machine gun some tourists, why not call it a success when we drop daisy cutters on a wedding celebration or a funeral? I feel for our military because they’re in a lose/lose situation no matter what they do.
October 15th, 2009 at 4:07 pm
How much money are we really talking about? 10,000 people times (say) $100,000 is a billion dollars. Not chicken feed, perhaps, but something we could realistically afford, even in a recession, if we decided it was important enough.
Of course where we’re going to find 10,000 people with the “linguistic skills and cultural knowledge” to fit in in Afghanistan is another question.
October 15th, 2009 at 6:57 pm
[...] Yglesias responds a bit, and thinks achieving that CRC (Civilian Response Corps) personnel might not be as difficult as [...]
October 15th, 2009 at 9:49 pm
max424> the name you are looking for is Thomas Barnett.
October 16th, 2009 at 5:38 am
Cassander
Yes, Thomas Barnett. Thank you, Cassander, very much.