COIN/Conventional Divide is Real
Greg Jaffe, speaking to Andrew Exum, says “This whole conventional vs. irregular debate is stupid.”
War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it. I think most lieutenants, captains and majors are beyond this false conventional vs. irregular frame that we try to impose on war. I wish I could say the same for the more senior people in the Pentagon.
I think there’s a lot of truth to that. At the same time, just because things look one way to “lieutenants, captains and majors” and another way to “senior people in the Pentagon” doesn’t mean we should take a dismissive view of the senior people’s outlook in a rush to celebrate the insights of the practical warfighter. United States military policy is, on one level, about brave men and women serving in uniform in difficult environments out of a sense of duty, honor, and patriotism. On another level, however, United States military policy is about control over by far the largest stream of public sector financing that exists in the world. Annual spending by the national security state (when you add in the spending that’s outside the “regular” Pentagon budget) is almost as high as the $900 billion ten year price tag for a universal health care bill.
And when you get down to the guts of defense budget politics, these high-level strategic concepts matter a great deal. Nobody, of course, is going to say that the U.S. should somehow completely abandon its ability to fight conventional wars. But the choice between a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to scare China & Russia” or a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to intervene effectively in third world backwaters” has very real implications for what kind of hardware purchases look cost effective. The 2017 budget deficit or the potential economic impact of a manufacturing plant closure in Georgia is not the kind of thing a lieutenant, captain, or major serving in the field is going to think about. But it’s still, in an objective sense, quite important and senior Pentagon figures are not mistaken to treat it as such.
And part of the subtext of the Afghanistan debate is that as a matter of bureaucratic warfare, it makes enormous sense for the currently ascendant COIN faction to try to press its advantages—to exaggerate the extent of what was achieved in Iraq in 2007, and to overstate the strategic significance of achieving some kind of comprehensive success in Afghanistan.
18 Responses to “COIN/Conventional Divide is Real”
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October 31st, 2009 at 4:14 pm
jaffe’s statement is stupid. there’s a huge difference between high-intensity conflict where you kill anything that moves (see e.g. the reduction of fallujah) versus attempting to win over a population by minimizing collateral damage and isolating a small group of hostiles.
this is not a “false frame”.
October 31st, 2009 at 4:31 pm
Jaffe is beyond stupid. For one thing, regular war includes an enemy government that can be forced to surrender.
Then, of course, there is the *ahem* slight illegality of simply imposing armed will on civilians because a few among them incur your displeasure. Plenty of ‘tough guys’ in the past have thought they were too big to be bothered by legalities, and very few of them have reached old age.
Even as we read, Clinton and Uribe are inking agreements for more war in South America. Our military has become a mindless machine looking for wars that are small enough to ‘win’.
October 31st, 2009 at 4:50 pm
War and armed conflict is the result of dozens of significant drivers – each a dimension in a matrix of social fears, needs and desires – and with that whole array duplicated on the other side of the conflict with different values to place in the boxes. Each dimension changes in importance dynamically with the context as well as with political administrations and even generationally.
To make a case for against war – or for or against a way to deal with a current war we are in – by pulling out one or two dimensions that happen to support one’s dominant beliefs about war generally, is hardly persuasive.
October 31st, 2009 at 5:04 pm
United States military policy is, on one level, about brave men and women serving in uniform in difficult environments out of a sense of duty, honor, and patriotism.
The effectiveness of militaristic propaganda couldn’t be much better under fascist or communist regimes in the past than it is in the US today, when you read this kind of Orwellian speak in a “progressive” blog written by someone who probably hasn’t spent one day in the military.
October 31st, 2009 at 5:15 pm
1) Shouldn’t the PRIMARY CRITERIA be defense of the United States?
Russia still has the capability to turn the United States into a fucking radioactive landscape. China does not –but could destroy several of our major cities, with the associated death toll and knockoff economic effects.
Deterring THAT is IMPORTANT.
In contrast, prevailing in some Third World shithole of little economic importance is a fucking diversion driven by little justification other than making some Neocons get a hardon. The Bush conduct of the US military policy has been a fucking disaster.
The proper response to Al Qaeda was to force them into a limited area and to then bomb the fucking piss out of that area. Walk away with the warning that we will be back if they give us any shit. Plus have the CIA put out a rewards program for snitches and a cheap assassination program.
But Washington DC is more fucking concerned about the image of some politicans than the lives of US Citizens. Which is why our stupid shit leaders have killed far more Americans with their political games than Al Qaeda killed on Sept 11.
Just who is the fucking enemy of the American people?
October 31st, 2009 at 5:33 pm
As is very well known, US soldiers have killed numerous civilians, engaged in torture, and committed other war crimes. The above statement is therefore palaver.
October 31st, 2009 at 5:38 pm
I wanted to comment on the ridiculous “war is war” meme, but reading back in the context, the sentence quoted isn’t particularly relevant to the question that was asked. Just an expletive directed at what Jaffe sees as excessive simplification of the debate. Not worth any discussion beyond that.
October 31st, 2009 at 5:43 pm
You write:
But the choice between a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to scare China & Russia” or a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to intervene effectively in third world backwaters” has very real implications for what kind of hardware purchases look cost effective.
Then you write:
…the potential economic impact of a manufacturing plant closure in Georgia is … still, in an objective sense, quite important and senior Pentagon figures are not mistaken to treat it as such.
Unless we are talking about the international impact of Georgia the country losing manufacturing jobs, and about how our foreign policy would be affected by that, this is only an issue if your position is that “the main purpose of the military is to give people make-work government jobs.”
That particular issue is all about patronage and is not in any way about what types of war we need to be prepared to fight. While it is true that we need to consider how issues such as this may cloud people’s perceptions of what is necessary, whether or not the type of military we have provides us with a lot of manufacturing jobs should not be taken into consideration in any analysis of what our military policy ought to be. “What does our military need to do their job” is the question; not “what can I get the military to buy from me?”
October 31st, 2009 at 5:56 pm
@5 Don Williamns: “China does not –but could destroy several of our major cities, with the associated death toll and knockoff economic effects.”
My understanding is that if China launched a sneaky nuclear first strike against the United States they could destribute accurately as many as 100 nuclear warheads with individual yields of between 10 and 40 megatons.
Granted, China’s pathetic nuclear first strike capability pales in comparison to the awe inspiring destructive power of the American and the Russian first strike arsenals, but still, China does posses the ability, if they so desire, to end all our hopes and dreams -coast to coast!
October 31st, 2009 at 7:17 pm
My “Annual spending by the national security state (when you add in the spending that’s outside the “regular” Pentagon budget) is almost as high as the $900 billion ten year price tag for a universal health care bill”
Nice try there, Matty. Did you include interests payments on debt accrued due to past military spending? No, I think not. Did you factor in the “real” cost of the Iraq War? Joe Stiglitz, a fine fellow and a respected economist, has pegged the cost of the war at $3 trillion already, and points out that much of the total cost is not reflected in the annual supplemental. And the “real” costs of these wars will not be felt for some time, and the United States taxpayer will be paying for these wars for several generations. Did you forget that?
Granted, its not entirely the Pentagon’s fault that national outlays on their behalf easily exceed ONE TRILLION DOLLARS. They didn’t demand to go to war, after all. But still, the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs should be held accountable for failure to get the job done considering the amount of money we give them.
And I think this is dawning on significant segment of our officer corps. AT ALL LEVELS. These officers, even some 2nd lieutenants, know that the organization they are a part of is virtually floating on the number one all-time gravy train in world history and yet this organization continually…botches things up. And I think some of them are finding it embarrassing, quite frankly, constantly getting their ass kicked despite having all the advantages, and they want to do something about it.
That is why I have no problem with the COIN document and its adherents. At least these people are trying to develop a coherent strategy for occupying backwater countries, because if that is what we are going to do, it is better to have an occupation strategy -of some kind- that can be developed and improved upon than to just invade and have officers at all levels become nothing but helpless cogs in a visionless Fuck Up Machine.
And you know what Matt, I think lieutenants, captains, and majors, in the field, and some colonels and generals too, are looking at the Pentagon/Congressional procurement process and saying “therein lies the real enemy.”
October 31st, 2009 at 7:27 pm
Then what exactly do you want from the military? A force that can do peacekeeping shit? Then you need global supply lines, COIN training, and all types of cultural assistance in the form of translators and the like. A force that can fight a range of conflicts from skirmish to all-out Great Power War? Then you need a large military with some serious diversification and the infrastructure and supplies to back it up. A force that can depend the US continental homeland?
Remember, it’s always the strategic objectives that come first that determine the spending in the US. As I’ve said before, if we wanted to get military costs way down at the expense of conventional flexibility, we could gut the Army, turn the Navy into mainly a platform for airstrikes and bombers, turn the Air Force back into SAC, and keep the Marines just in case – then base the US home defense and strategy around nuclear weapons.
October 31st, 2009 at 8:34 pm
The answer to our Afghanistan dilemma is here:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html
The Soviet-backed government was able to infiltrate the rebels. With at most elements of the Pakistani govt backing the Taliban, this should be even easier. Get American troops out of there, give Karzai an adequate treasury, and that should be it.
Quote:
“…In 1982, the CIA predicted that the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan would help “generate political unrest and retard economic development until the end of the century.”(19) While many Pakistanis demonstrated great hospitality and tolerance for the refugees, others despised their presence. Cables from Pakistan reveal violent clashes between Pakistani border tribes and Afghan refugees over scarce resources and political, religious and personal differences. Some disgruntled tribes even took weapons and money from the Afghan government to disrupt rebel supply lines into Afghanistan.
In fact, the Afghan government’s infiltration of Pakistan and the rebel parties was extensive and proved key to its survival. The government’s ministry of state security, known as KHAD, sought to buy or rent the loyalty of Pashtun tribes who inhabited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area (the tribes often inhabited both sides of the border). Weapons and money were doled out to tribal militia who in turn interdicted rebel supply operations based in Pakistan. Some tribal leaders responded to Kabul’s material aid with political support, attending government jirgahs (assemblies) and other PDPA-sponsored activities. President Zia tried to undercut the Pakistan-based tribes’ support for the Afghan government by, among other means, conducting selective anti-narcotics sweeps through their home areas. Kabul’s strategy, however, continued to be successful, and ultimately contributed to the rise of Najibullah, the KHAD’s director and the man responsible for this counterinsurgency campaign, to the leader of the DRA in 1986. “
November 1st, 2009 at 6:09 am
Why oh why and Hazpurn – have another sip of your latte and leave the real world to the grown-ups.
There are a couple different ways to view this “divide”. There is the COIN and or Conventional approach to war that is the cause of a lot of discussion within the military. The general officer class affect this discussion by rewarding or dismissing those junior officers that don’t see it their way. Hernandez/Casey saw war as an exercise in breaking and blowing up stuff thus four wasted years in Iraq. Petreuas (sp?) got it right and hopefully McChrystal will too.
There is also the influence of the military-industrial complex that sees the defense of the US and its interests as a huge milk cow. This notion is aided and abetted by politicians. Politicians will sing the praises of jobs in their district but will also pocket huge donations from industry. These are the scare mongers that will use fear to shake down the taxpayer with visions of some futuristic apocalypse. No one can confront us conventionally. W. Europe is not going to get invaded and I am sure we can keep the sea lanes open to Europe, the ME and most of Asia/Australia.
November 1st, 2009 at 6:12 am
BTW – the most cogent read I have found ref. Afghanistan. Written by a SF MAJ with a couple tours of Afghanistan and Iraq. The website given will get you to the .pdf document.
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/
November 1st, 2009 at 7:44 am
At the same time, just because things look one way to “lieutenants, captains and majors” and another way to “senior people in the Pentagon” doesn’t mean we should take a dismissive view of the senior people’s outlook in a rush to celebrate the insights of the practical warfighter.
You should stick to what you know, although I am hard pressed to know just what that is.
It certainly isn’t historical: there’s no dialectice here, after all. Johnson listened to senior people in the Pentagon, who lied their fucking asses and ended up killing many, many thousands.
Is this is a preemptory shill for the ineviatable Obomba ploy of: “Following the advice of senior military leaders….”
November 2nd, 2009 at 2:51 am
Thanks, but after the deficits catch up with the military and it is left without its high tech gizmos, then the “grown up” aspects of things will become more clear.
November 2nd, 2009 at 3:30 pm
Spending on conventional warfare mean building lots of high tech shit. High tech shit gives ancillary civilian benefits like the internet and civilian aviation. Spending on COIN is just a waste. It just goes to contractors and mercenaries and warlord bribes. The only civilian spinoff is that you might have a handful of guys who can speak urdu or some other worthless language.
November 3rd, 2009 at 2:34 am
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