America’s Role in Afghan Corruption
Joanna Nathan, who lived in Kabul from 2003 to 2009 working for the Institute for War and then the International Crisis Group, says the United States needs to clean up its own act if we want to improve the corruption situation in Afghanistan:
But before the U.S. administration is in any real position to make demands of the Afghan government, it needs to get its own act together. Over-reliance on expensive private contractors needs to be severely curtailed with the focus put on injecting money through Afghan government systems in a way that strengths local institutions rather than subverts them. The measure of effectiveness needs to be on impact on the ground rather than the sheer amounts poured in. Overarching this must be a cohesive approach across U.S. government agencies as to who is being engaged and ensuring that that no one has impunity.
Up on the 11th floor here at CAP Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Christina Misunas recently did a piece on America’s faustian bargains with Afghan warlords that makes many overlapping points.
17 Responses to “America’s Role in Afghan Corruption”
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October 30th, 2009 at 11:45 am
She is essentially making the traditional (and valid) criticism against foreign aid in general. Those arguments have had little or no effect on the foreign aid machine. And they will have no effect on US’ Afghan policy.
October 30th, 2009 at 11:53 am
We need to stop the bad corruption (of US private contractors and DOD employees) so we can increase the good corruption (of Afghan warlords and drug lords).
And we can’t get out because war in Afghanistan is the one campaign promise Obama can’t break.
October 30th, 2009 at 12:12 pm
Quick, send McChrystal’s torture/reconstruction teams to the House!
We need to find a way to inject money through American “government systems in a way that strengths institutions rather than subverts them.”
October 30th, 2009 at 12:13 pm
But what if what we call corruption is actually just an error in our own perception? What if this were actually a part of the world where people are not expected to act for any common good (which they see as a form of weakness) but in their own selfish interest which is focused on survival (which they see as maintaining honor).
In such a case then allegiance becomes something that is first provided according to blood ties and must be purchased beyond that through favors and guarantees of protection, even the risking of one’s life, where the honor of both parties is at stake.
Western cognitive egocentrism drips from such accounts as this and illustrates why success is only achieved in the ME when we accept the system that has run their affairs for centuries – and when we decide to be better at it (which the average American would see as more corrupt) than the factions there that are our enemies.
October 30th, 2009 at 12:34 pm
Following on from #4 I’d propose that the underlying problem with our ME policies is not that we’re not willing to buy influence and spend a lot of money doing it – it’s the honor thing. When you watch interviews of Afghanis the thing they always stress is how can they be certain that we will not abandon them when he next politician gets into office and decides that the policies of the incumbent he just beat were full of crap and he’s going to reverse them as part of his mandate.
Notice how we treated Afghanistan when the Soviets left and we no longer had a cold-war need to be there. In this sense we come off as being particularly corrupt – in Afganistan’s terms – and not to be trusted. This Westerner has sympathy with that view.
October 30th, 2009 at 12:42 pm
Following on from #5 – Obama is now going to answer the question for them. He will either show the Afghanis that we are as corrupt and untrustworthy as they suspect or that we might actually be honorable and honest allies that can be provisionally trusted a little bit with their future.
I’m afraid though that Obama’s caution here and his lengthy “re-evaluations” of existing policy – with nary a mention of past commitments, even his own – have already told them all they need to know.
October 30th, 2009 at 12:53 pm
I just saw that David Brooks has a very “on topic” editorial in the NYT this morning. He casts the question in terms of Obama’s questionable “determination” to win in Afghanistan – rather than as a question of honor (and determination) to fulfill our past commitments, past bargains agreed to – which I think is more the way the Afghanis see it.
But David is right. Obama is questioning whether it is still in our interest to support this effort. What no Americans seem to understand, including David, is that it’s the questioning that that Afghanis will see as corruption under their terms – and is already reducing their trust in us and causing them to hedge their bets.
It’s a good editorial:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/opinion/30brooks.html?_r=1
October 30th, 2009 at 1:22 pm
There are many, many Afghans in government (and out) who are not corrupt – even by the maximalist definitions the NATO nations like to push. There are in fact entire Ministries in the Afghan government where corruption gets you fired. The cultural arguments do not allow for this – and therefore are wrong.
Whenever someone says “the corrupt Afghan govenrment”, ask them who they mean. If they can’t give you a name, then they don’t know what the hell they’re talking about (and “Karzai” doesn’t count – unless your interlocutor can point to something specific). It is really important to disaggregate here. Don’t write off Afghanistan because you don’t like the character Karzai plays in the US press.
A way to support “government systems in a way that strengths institutions rather than subverts them” would be to pursue the things that are working. E.g. the National Solidarity Programme is working – but is still massively underfunded. Also, the Ministry of Finance under Ashraf Ghani successfully tracked money coming into Afghanistan so that the donor corruption we now see was kept to a minimum.
There are ways to work with Afghanistan so that Afghanistan will work. More troops may or may not be part of that. But more troops won’t help AT ALL if we don’t get the other pieces right. And if we get the other pieces right, then more troops might not be necessary.
October 30th, 2009 at 1:37 pm
“There are in fact entire Ministries in the Afghan government where corruption gets you fired.”
And the people who work in these ministries were all hired because of their GPA’s and proven experience in the field – and not because their cousin is a friend of the guy who heads the ministry, who is the brother of the Prime Minister?
I’m open to having my beliefs regarding Afghan culture corrected by someone who knows more about it than I. You’ve expressed an opinion above. What do you base it on? What NGO do you (or did you) work for if I could ask?
October 30th, 2009 at 2:44 pm
And there you see the glory that is Seattle.
October 30th, 2009 at 2:48 pm
serial, you do know the definition of bigotry, don’t you?
October 30th, 2009 at 3:09 pm
I hope we don’t revisit the situation described by Fire In The Lake, where the local officials, presented with a flood of US goods and financing beyond their dreams of avarice, proceeded to steal on a vast scale.
Given the mismatch between the Afghan GDP and the cost of the war, I’ve got a bad feeling about this.
October 30th, 2009 at 6:02 pm
The Minister of the Interior is Haneef Atmar. He worked for Norwegian Church Aid in the 90s and is one of the founders of the Afghan NGO Co-operation for Peace and Unity (CPAU; Afghans don’t get the joke). Atmar was moved/volunteered (stories differ) to Interior from Education and to Education from Rural Rehabilitation and Development. He was initially brought into the government because he knows rural development better than almost anybody. He was moved to Education to de-corrupt it and turn it into an effective Ministry. He succeeded.
The current Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is Mohammed Ehsan Zia. He too worked for Norwegian Church Aid in the 90s. He has kept the Ministry uncorrupt and the National Solidarity Programme that gets such praise from Western politicians is under the MRRD.
Most of the other founders of CPAU are now in government too (I’ve heard the number put at 18 of the first 20, but haven’t confirmed that), many at the Deputy Minister level. CPAU has a very good reputation in the NGO community and has never been accused of existing to enrich its staff.
I’ve watched these guys (especially Zia, who is in fact a good friend) work since the 90s. They are very good and they attract the people who want to work for an Afghanistan that works. Visit the MRRD and you meet a lot of idealists. That is a bit of a problem: the MRRD is staffed by very young people and there are not enough of the older, wiser guys to teach them how to be practical.
The Afghan patriots face an uphill battle. But they know that much, much better than you or I ever could.
October 30th, 2009 at 6:24 pm
I prefer to not to say who I currently work with. I’ve known NGO staff kicked out of countries because they commented on blogs in an identifiable manner. It’s enough to make you paranoid.
I’ve been in and out of Afghanistan since 2004. I’ve worked with some of the CPAU people on a variety of projects since the 90s.
Anyway, I’d beat the same drum about any governemnt being derided as wholly corrupt and therefore unworthy of support. Find the people who are not corrupt – and they are there – and support the hell out their initiatives. Create incentives for non-corruption. Minimize the incentives for corruption. It’s doable.
There is a lot of theft of resources in Afghanistan. I know it better than most of you as I’ve had to keep my money from being stolen. Some of that theft though is not by Afghans. A fair amount is American, British, Turkish, Pakistani to name the nationalities of some I know of.
October 30th, 2009 at 7:02 pm
NGO – No problem with not identifying your employer. You seem authentic and so I hope you stay around as I’d like to learn more from someone who has been there.
You list Afghani officials who you say are not corrupt. Could I ask what that means to you? I know you include that they are not enriching their staff and you believe they are acting from patriotism. There are those who work for NGO’s like HRW and AI who believe that Hamas and IJ are not corrupt and are acting out of patriotism shooting rockets and mortars at civilians in Southern Israel. Do you agree with them?
Do the uncorrupted officials you mention oppose the US presence in Afghanistan and our attempts to fight the Talibal and al Quada there? If so do you think they are justified and acting out of patriotism? Sorry to ask such pointed questions but with the record of HRW and AI it is necessary as it would naturally make a difference as to how I interpret your opinions. Thanks
November 2nd, 2009 at 5:59 pm
Ray, you’ve got problems with AI and HRW? What am I supposed to make of your opinions based on that admission? (smile)
What is corruption? I hew pretty closely to the line that to call it corruption there has to be a transaction involving illegitimate transfer of finances or power. Violence may well promote or be the result of corruption and violence may well be criminal. Violence is not in and of itself corrupt. I also ask about and listen to local definitions. They do not always jibe with my own perceptions. But there are always definitions of what is corrupt.
When the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan, most of the mujahideen tried to go back to ordinary life, but some started the civil war. I’ve heard more than one former mujahideen say, “The war against the Soviet Union was a jihad, but the civil war was not. Muslims don’t kill Muslims.” This attitude was a driving factor in the choice of an NGO career for a fair number of Afghan NGO workers in the 90s.
The Taliban were as successful as they were because they promised to end the civil war. I’ve heard more than one Afghan say, “The Taliban promised us peace. They lied.” Some of my friends passively supported the Taliban in the 90s in the sense that they believed the rhetoric about Islamic brotherhood, peace, and faith. They willfully ignored the rhetoric about purity and culture. They now talk freely about how they allowed themselves to believe the part of the message they wanted to hear. They really, really do not like the Taliban. (Others who didn’t believe the Taliban at the beginning still don’t like them, but don’t seem to hate them quite so much. Broken promises matter.)
However, they also disaggregate the Taliban. There are the hardcore religious zealots, the opportunists who pick the most powerful side or the one that aligns with their interests, the bandits who know the word “Taliban” scares people into compliance, the kids who think being talib is cool, the foreigners from the Gulf States, the young men whose families were humiliated by ISAF soldiers and who want revenge, etc into a dozen different shades. My colleagues, in and out of government, think negotiation could pull a fair number of “Taliban” into the mainstream of Afghan society. They absolutely want to talk, but US policy has made such conversations almost impossible (in any official capacity; I don’t know that they are talking, but I suspect).
They also, for the most part, want the US there. It seems like the rest of NATO/ISAF they can take or leave, but there is a security component of US presence they feel they need right now. I’ve heard quite positive things about the military training (which never get into the US press) and a repeated wish that the US would take over the police training as well. But these things are never quite so black and white as all that. There is a lot of criticism of US policy and US military tactics and general US fecklessness. If they said it was time for the US to go, I’d take that seriously. Of course, like all people everywhere, they have their different takes on the situation and their opinions. When a lot of the Afghans I know start calling for the US to go – and we are nowhere near that – then I’d listen hard to their reasons. Just as right now, I listen hard to their reasons for the US staying.
November 4th, 2009 at 10:07 pm
NGO – Thanks for your careful answer. I need to digest. I am currently on a road trip but I should have time in the next few days to get back to you. I sense a gap between your perception and mine. You seem to convey the impression that the Afghanis you deal with are the same as any American or European in terms of values and sensibilities. Also, that such people are representative of all Afghanis.
Other accounts I have read consistently say that it is necessary to understand the underpinnings of Afgani culture to interpret what they say and their actions. You seem to have not even considered the possibility that they would respond differently in any way than a typical American to the same inputs.
Maybe I have misinterpreted your words. Could you please clarify your views on these cultural questions. Are the NGO workers you deal with different from average Afghanis? Are they Europeans or Americans?
Thanks, Ray