Doubting the Af/Pak Link
(dod photo)
Bernard Finel has a number of excellent questions about our Afghanistan policy. This one is probably the best:
What precisely is the nature of the risk a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would pose to the stability of Pakistan? From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, and yet by most indications, Pakistan was under less threat from Islamist radicals then than now. What has changed to make Afghanistan now the lynchpin on which the stability of Pakistan rests?
Now we can understand part of the story here. The rise of the “Pakistani Taliban” is certainly a new and important factor. At the same time, it’s not only the case that previous Taliban rule of Afghanistan didn’t threaten Pakistani stability, Taliban rule of Afghanistan was encouraged by Pakistan. Pakistan changed its attitude toward this under pressure from the United States which, in turn, has the consequence of changing the Taliban’s attitude toward the Pakistani government. But it’s really unclear how promoting a Tajik-dominated Afghan government that Pakistan perceives as contrary to its interests helps advance Pakistani stability. And one of America’s major adversaries in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network, seems straightforwardly in bed with the Pakistanis.
15 Responses to “Doubting the Af/Pak Link”
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August 27th, 2009 at 11:33 am
This is presumably the fault of Bernard and his editors at FP, but … it’s “linchpin” not “lynchpin”.
Plus, the phrase “the [linchpin] on which the stability of Pakistan rests” just seems awkward. Nothing “rests on” a linchpin!
The fundamental analogy isn’t completely inapt. A linchpin keeps the wheel from falling off its axle. Maybe a better way of writing it would have been “What has changed to make Afghanistan now the linchpin that prevents Pakistan from coming apart?” or something like that.
August 27th, 2009 at 11:42 am
Good description of the situation in Afghanistan by someone who has worked there: Conor Foley at Crooked Timber.
August 27th, 2009 at 11:58 am
One important thing to consider is that, prior to 2001, the Taliban were safe and in control of Afghanistan. The war forced a retreat by the Taliban forces, and the safest place to retreat and retrench was in the mountainous region of the Afghani/Pakistani border. The mere presence of so many Taliban on the border would, obviously, make this group a much greater threat to the Pakistanis than previously.
August 27th, 2009 at 12:03 pm
The term ‘AfPak’ itself reeks of military stupidity and groupthink. All this talk of Akpak here and Afpak there now used by academics and journalists who probably have never been to either country for more than a couple of days, at best, and don’t speak any of the region’s languages.
August 27th, 2009 at 12:51 pm
It’s not entirely accurate to say that “Taliban rule of Afghanistan was encouraged by Pakistan.” Taliban rule was encouraged by the ISI — a serious player in Pakistani politics, to be sure, but not the same thing as “Pakistan” full stop. And, of course, the ISI had its own reasons for supporting the Taliban.
August 27th, 2009 at 1:03 pm
MY “The rise of the “Pakistani Taliban” is certainly a new and important factor.”
If you are describing the Taliban’s actual physical location, then yes, the “Pakistani Taliban” is only six or seven years old. They date back to the time when 32 slump shouldered CIA operatives parachuted into Afghanistan and chased the Taliban across the Af/Pak border.
But, as you ably point out in this same post, the Taliban has always been the Pakistani Taliban, really, at least in the hearts of minds of the ISI and other influential power brokers in Pakistan.
August 27th, 2009 at 1:08 pm
Slightly off topic: Does the photo seem strange? It looks like the Photoshop “lasso” is on it. Maybe it is just my browser.
August 27th, 2009 at 1:21 pm
There is potential for the ISI to use the Taliban as a “deniable” arm of covert agents against their political enemies. However, eliminating the Taliban, as unlikely as that is, would only reduce their recruiting pool.
August 27th, 2009 at 2:12 pm
I think it’s correct to say that the Pakistani Taliban does pose a threat to Pakistan, but not an existential one. But, the Afghan Taliban provides what is called in Pakistani parlance– strategic depth. The two top vote getters in the recent election, Karzai and Abdullah have deep connections to India. Karzai was educated in India and Abdullah lived in exile there and his family still live in Delhi. Marshall Fahim, Karzai’s running mate had long military ties with India when he was in the Northern Alliance. Those in Pakistan that view all through the lens of India would see the Afghan Taliban as a useful counterweight to India’s influence at the very top of the current Afghan leadership.
August 27th, 2009 at 2:34 pm
Pakistan is now saying Al Qaeda has been effectively wiped out in Pakistan, having fled to Somalia, etc. So I guess bin Laden and Al Zawahiri should be getting their Hellfire stikes soon?
They should be required to cough up these before any more aid goes to them.
August 27th, 2009 at 3:24 pm
[...] like one of the core Bush administration justifications for slogging it out in Iraq. But given the murkiness of other arguments for a prolonged engagement, I suspect this rationale carries more weight at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. [...]
August 27th, 2009 at 4:09 pm
What are the odds that we’re just being played for suckers by politicians in both countries?
This is rapidly turning into Mr. Obama’s War.
August 28th, 2009 at 12:00 am
I would go one step forward and say ‘What precisely is the nature of the risk a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would pose to the stability of World?’. Now a lot of terrorist attack by AlQaeda originated from Afghanistan, but Taliban are not AlQaeda (although having a symbiotic relationship). They are a very local phenomenon and have no global designs, unlike AlQaeda. Consider this gem from Taliban via NYTimes
They were capable of reducing an international event to something very local. They do not even invoke Islamic values or teaching — and they are considered them fundamentalist militant ‘Islamists’. What global ambitions can you have with these ‘tribal values and custims’. Compare this to AlQaeda justifying its attacks on Western civilians by saying that by voting in their Govts and supporting armies though taxes each and every one of them is a valid target.
A Taliban govt in Afghanistan would, like all govts, first of all try to preserve itself (however regressive and fascist that regime might be). There is some evidence that the Taliban govt would have driven out Bin Laden in 2001 had it been possible for them. And one of the reason for their weakness was that they were never recognized as govt by world, never had seat at UN, never engaged by world.
What might happen in Afghanistan, as foreign forces leave, is that both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban would focus their attention to fighting in Afghanistan, a much easy war for them than their struggle in Pakistan (a very different country from Afghanistan), with some help from Pakistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan regain their historical status of buffer zone.
August 28th, 2009 at 4:10 am
What precisely is the nature of the risk a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would pose to the stability of Pakistan? From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, and yet by most indications
August 28th, 2009 at 9:16 am
[...] from the administration and its defenders,” observes Michael Crowley, but “given the murkiness of other arguments for a prolonged engagement, I suspect this rationale carries more weight at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. [...]