Defining “Victory” in Afghanistan
(DOD photo)
As Ezra Klein says “It would be nice if Anthony Cordesman definied the word ‘victory’ in this piece.” Or, again, it would have been nice if one of the editors of the Washington Post opinion section had made that observation before running the piece rather than waiting for one of their bloggers to notice it. But it really does make the specific claims he offers about what we ought to do in order to achieve victory hard to evaluate. His failure to do so is part of the annoying trend toward defining Afghanistan strategy debates in incredibly stark, binary terms. Either we need to commit maxim resources to a maximalist strategy, or else we’re going to admit “defeat” and cut and run. Realistically, though, there’s a broad middle ground of options between “eliminate all US support for Afghan government and let the Taliban run amok” and “engage in decades-long effort to remark all of Afghan politics and society.”
Another note I would offer on the Cordesman piece is that he defines the problems we need to confront in the region as including not only the Taliban, but also the government of Afghanistan (”Bush administration . . . did not react to the growing corruption of Hamid Karzai’s government”) and the government of Pakistan (”Bush administration . . . treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service . . . still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtuns to Pakistan’s advantage.”) This of course raises the question of on whose behalf this fighting is happening? The stability of Pakistan is often offered as the reason we need to be fighting the Taliban, but if it’s folly to be treating Pakistan as an ally then how much sense does this make? And if Karzai is part of the problem, too, then who’s side are we on?
Last but by no means least, it seems ridiculous to premise strategy on the idea that we need to somehow get Pakistan to stop trying to manipulate Afghan Pashtuns to Pakistan’s advantage. Are they supposed to manipulate them to Pakistan’s disadvantage? Is Pakistan supposed to become more indifferent to events in an adjacent country than the United States is? As long as Pakistan is stronger than Afghanistan—and it’s much, much stronger—then of course it will try to manipulate the situation there to its advantage.
18 Responses to “Defining “Victory” in Afghanistan”
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August 31st, 2009 at 12:35 pm
RE “but if it’s folly to be treating Pakistan as an ally then how much sense does this make? ”
——-
About 200 Kilotons worth
August 31st, 2009 at 12:48 pm
If victory has not been defined yet, then we have already lost.
Of course, we’re 7 years past that.
August 31st, 2009 at 12:49 pm
“maxim resources”
Mmmmm. Maxim resources.
August 31st, 2009 at 12:54 pm
The intractability of South/Central Asia is part of what made Iraq look so attractive as alledgedly low-lying fruit.
When Afghanistan became part of the War on Drugs is where the problem really started.
August 31st, 2009 at 1:12 pm
“As Ezra Klein says “It would be nice if Anthony Cordesman defined the word ‘victory’…”
Lucky for us Cordesman isn’t C of C. Obama is – where’s his definition?
August 31st, 2009 at 1:25 pm
How many times do we have to watch this same fucking movie?
Tell you what, why don’t we just cut straight to the ending this time (evacuation helicopters on the roof of the US Embassy in Kabul.)
August 31st, 2009 at 1:37 pm
Either we need to commit maxim resources to a maximalist strategy,
I think committing “maxim resources” to a war in Afghanistan was the 19th Century British strategy there too.
August 31st, 2009 at 1:57 pm
[...] original post here: Matthew Yglesias » Defining “Victory” in Afghanistan Share and [...]
August 31st, 2009 at 2:35 pm
“How many times do we have to watch this same fucking movie?”
Only until the money runs out – not long now, with debt heading
up towards 100% of GDP over the next few years.
August 31st, 2009 at 2:36 pm
I think committing “maxim resources” to a war in Afghanistan was the 19th Century British strategy there too.
“Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim gun, and they have not!”
It stopped being quite so jolly when “they” got the Maxim gun too.
August 31st, 2009 at 2:52 pm
[...] pursuing at least not in the time or for the cost that would be required. Commenter as diverse as Matthew Yglesias and Dennis the Peasant have pointed out that neither Dr. Cordeman nor Gen. McChrystal nor the Obama [...]
August 31st, 2009 at 5:35 pm
===
Yeah. I was surprised when the armed forces announced they were adding drug traffickers to their target lists…and even more surprised that they thought this was a good thing.
“I’m worried that the War on Terror isn’t vague enough. It might end some day…I know, let’s make it a War on Drugs, too!”
Whoever is writing the official history of the US-Afghan War, I have a title for you: We’ve Learned Nothing.
August 31st, 2009 at 7:16 pm
[...] pursuing at least not in the time or at the cost that would be required. Commenters as diverse as Matthew Yglesias and Dennis the Peasant have pointed out that neither Dr. Cordeman nor Gen. McChrystal nor the Obama [...]
August 31st, 2009 at 7:47 pm
“Victory” is the rabbit in a dog race.
August 31st, 2009 at 10:03 pm
Cordesman can no longer be taken seriously.
September 1st, 2009 at 9:01 am
[...] Matthew Yglesias | As Ezra Klein says “It would be nice if Anthony Cordesman definied the word ‘victory’ in this piece.” Or, again, it would have been nice if one of the editors of the Washington Post opinion section had made that observation before running the piece rather than waiting for one of their bloggers to notice it. But it really does make the specific claims he offers about what we ought to do in order to achieve victory hard to evaluate. His failure to do so is part of the annoying trend toward defining Afghanistan strategy debates in incredibly stark, binary terms. Either we need to commit maxim resources to a maximalist strategy, or else we’re going to admit “defeat” and cut and run. Realistically, though, there’s a broad middle ground of options between “eliminate all US support for Afghan government and let the Taliban run amok” and “engage in decades-long effort to remark all of Afghan politics and society.” Another note I would offer on the Cordesman piece is that he defines the problems we need to confront in the region as including not only the Taliban, but also the government of Afghanistan (”Bush administration . . . did not react to the growing corruption of Hamid Karzai’s government”) and the government of Pakistan (”Bush administration . . . treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service . . . still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtuns to Pakistan’s advantage.”) This of course raises the question of on whose behalf this fighting is happening? The stability of Pakistan is often offered as the reason we need to be fighting the Taliban, but if it’s folly to be treating Pakistan as an ally then how much sense does this make? And if Karzai is part of the problem, too, then who’s side are we on? [...]
September 1st, 2009 at 9:06 am
You know, “victory,” with the parades and stuff.
September 2nd, 2009 at 6:58 am
[...] pursuing at least not in the time or at the cost that would be required. Commenters as diverse as Matthew Yglesias and Dennis the Peasant have pointed out that neither Dr. Cordeman nor Gen. McChrystal nor the Obama [...]