Matt Yglesias

Jul 8th, 2009 at 10:42 am

Perils of the Progressive Block

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As I said below, and as Chris Bowers isn’t shy about pointing out himself, over the past 24 hours the “progressive block” strategy he’s been advocating seems to be bearing fruit. The idea here is that rather than progressives always caving to more moderate members in the name of pragmatism, that progressives need to draw a line in the sand (in this case around the public option) and say that they will spike any bill that doesn’t meet their demands.

Today this looks to be working, but it is worth saying that this is a dangerous game. One recalls, for example, the time when Richard Nixon almost brought us universal health care:

Despite the heated politics of Watergate, national health-care legislation was proceeding in Congress thanks to a compromise brokered by a young Democratic senator from Massachusetts, Edward Kennedy, a Nixon nemesis.

But then, according to a 1974 political almanac published by Congressional Quarterly, the AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers lobbied successfully to kill the plan. Unions hoped to get a better deal after the next elections.

In retrospect, that particular iteration of the progressive block strategy doesn’t look so smart. And it’s possible that this time around, too, it’ll turn out that the votes aren’t there for a bill with a strong public option and the votes aren’t there for a bill without one either.






46 Responses to “Perils of the Progressive Block”

  1. onceler Says:

    Wow, massively wrong, again. This isn’t the 70s, and it’s not the progressives who will be selling us down the river here. It’s the ’sensible liberals’ (ala Tom Tomorrow), like yourself.

  2. Ed Smithe Says:

    56 Democratic Senators and a Republican president is a pretty big difference from 60 Dems and a Democratic president.

    Also, a lot of those 1974 Democrats were Dixiecrats.

  3. ron Says:

    And the AMA and the other usual suspects sat on the sidelines?
    Yeah right.

  4. Halfdan Says:

    Um, I’m not sure I understand your point. You’re saying Democrats ought to proceed carefully before spiking a universal health care bill that doesn’t include universal health care?

  5. Petey Says:

    “Wow, massively wrong, again.”

    Matthew basically doesn’t get politics. And healthcare reform is substantially a political matter, so of course Matthew isn’t going to quite get the mechanics of it correct.

    “This isn’t the 70s, and it’s not the progressives who will be selling us down the river here. It’s the ’sensible liberals’ (ala Tom Tomorrow), like yourself.”

    Matty’s not a “sensible liberal”. He’s a Rockefeller Republican.

  6. DTM Says:

    I won’t speak for Bowers (and I will repeat I don’t agree this is somehow Bowers’ baby), but this strategy as I understand it isn’t about actually blocking legislation. Rather, it is about trying to make the legislation that gets passed better (from a “progressive” point of view). As we were discussing elsewhere, the strategy won’t work if too many Democrats would be fine with no bill at all. But it should work in cases where the Democrats as a whole are committed to delivering a bill.

    Which they are in the case of health care reform. That is why I really don’t think it is particularly likely the votes won’t be there if, in the end, a bill with a public option emerges from the conference committee. I just don’t see any Senate Democrats being willing to play the spoiler at that point.

  7. theAmericanist Says:

    Always concede on “principle”.

  8. Opie Curious Says:

    Goddammit, Matt. Several of your commenters on the last post — and, from this post, apparently you, too — didn’t read Bowers’ post. Bowers specifically says you need a Democratic President. Both the White House and the Dem leadership need to see the bill in question as too vital not to pass. Clearly, Nixon was trying to do a good thing with healthcare for whatever reason, but he and the Democratic leadership certainly did not have the exact same policy and political priorities.

    This is so obviously true. With a Republican President, progressive obstructionism will simply end with moderate Dems voting with the GOP and getting the President’s agenda passed. With legislation that “would be nice but isn’t essential,” the leadership will be only too happy to tell the progressives to sit and spin. You need both, and the lesson of Nixon is: if you want to have input into a bill, don’t be obstructionist when a President of the opposite party is trying to do most of what you want in the first place. (Cf. NAFTA and NCLB.)

  9. Ted Says:

    Comments # 1, 4, and 5 miss the whole point. MY is not saying “whoa, progressives, don’t try anything risky.” He already, earlier this morning, said, “hell yes, we need a progressive block.” So what gives here? In this post he is doing something freaky and weird — brace yourself for this –

    He’s looking at the other side of the question.

    Zomg, cognitive dissonance.

  10. Ted Says:

    Our My Pretty Pony version of the Khmer Rouge needs to hold its horses and get some context.

  11. Why oh why Says:

    The Unions also attacked Pearl Harbour and tricked Kennedy into Vietnam.

  12. Poptarts Says:

    Our My Pretty Pony version of the Khmer Rouge needs to hold its horses and get some context.

    haha, good to see MPPKR again.

    Take the stimulus package for example. Now we see it was too small and doesn’t take effect quickly enough, but would we have been better without any stimulus package?

  13. Halfdan Says:

    Ted, that would be fine but Matt is invoking the “perils” of the progressive block without telling us what they, in this instance, would be. So, specifically, what is the progressive block at risk of losing by pushing for the public plan?

  14. jeff Says:

    Ted,

    Zomg, he is not merely assesing the other side.

    Rather, he is drawing historically innacurate analogies to look as if he is showing the other side of the question. What this is really about is that, MY, per usual, wants to sound pragmatic – when he is being anything but. Moving pragmatically would suggest that, with 60 Senators, a Democratic House and a Democratic President, passing publicly popular – and putative Dem. platform – legislation is a no brainer.

    However, to no fault of progressives, it is a little funny to see how this has been rediscribed. This really should not seem to be a Pregressive block strategy but a Democratic strategy. For both political and policy reasons passing a good bill is important and the leadership (Obama, Reid etc) need to realize this.

  15. scott Says:

    Ted:

    MY prefaced his discussion of the episode from the 1970’s by saying that the progressive bloc strategy appeared to be working but that it was “a dangerous game.” As halfdan and jeff have noted, MY seems to be on the one hand saying that agitating to get what you want is a good thing while on the other hand saying that doing that under historically very different circumstances was a bad idea. Any lack of clarity that we might be having about what “the point” is here is attributable to MY and not to us.

  16. Max424 Says:

    In two posts Matt has been accused of being a communist sympathizer and a Rockefeller Republican. I like it. I like a man who can see the big picture, see all things from all points of view. Matt apparently (and I accuse!) is a radical Buddhist.

  17. Eric Says:

    Excuse me while I pile on the bandwagon.

    In addition to the political changes mentioned by several other posters (Dem vs Rep Prez, 60 Dem senators vs 56, etc), I would point out that healthcare is exponentially more expensive than it was in 1974, and the need to do something about it – right now – has increased unmeasurably.

    All in all, I don’t think the situation in 1974 works out as a “cautionary tale” as much as MY thinks it does.

  18. DTM Says:

    Ted,

    I think the point many of us are making is that Matt is simply wrong to identify that prior event as “an iteration of the progressive block strategy”. So while it is fine to consider the risks involved in this (or any other) strategy, I do think it is important to first have a firm grasp on what the strategy actually entails.

  19. mC@G Says:

    So do we go to the mattresses or what?

  20. halpburn Says:

    A big difference between 1972 and today is that – even though if failed to pass healthcare – the Democratic party survived as a credible political organization.

  21. Poptarts Says:

    Hey My Pretty Ponies of the Khmer Rouge, Matt says it’s working now so why does it matter if the analogy isn’t exactly perfect? All he’s saying is that it doesn’t work in every instance.

    If the unions had played their cards right back then, we wouldn’t be forced to deal with health care now and could be spending our time and energy on other issues.

  22. Ted Says:

    @18: Well, that’s a reasonable objection; I’m afraid I don’t know enough about the definition of “a progressive block strategy” to assess it.

    @13-15: Sorry, everything you guys are saying boils down to “Egad, what is this thing you call on the other hand?? It hath an uncouth look, and methinks I trust it not.”

    Matt’s rhetorical moves are perfectly clear. He’s not urging moderation; he’s suggesting that every strategy has risks.

  23. DTM Says:

    [S]o why does it matter if the analogy isn’t exactly perfect? All he’s saying is that it doesn’t work in every instance.

    Because if your proposed analogy is not in fact analogous, you haven’t come up with an instance of the strategy not working. Among other things, that means by considering this non-analogous case, you may not learn anything of value about the conditions in which the strategy might fail, and indeed you might be lead to draw erroneous conclusions.

  24. Poptarts Says:

    Because if your proposed analogy is not in fact analogous, you haven’t come up with an instance of the strategy not working. Among other things, that means by considering this non-analogous case, you may not learn anything of value about the conditions in which the strategy might fail, and indeed you might be lead to draw erroneous conclusions.

    But he says the strategy is working, i.e. “over the past 24 hours the “progressive block” strategy he’s been advocating seems to be bearing fruit.”

    The only conclusion one who is not a registered My Pretty Pony of the Khmer Rouge with preconceived notions would draw is that in this other, slightly different instance, the strategy did not work and we all paid a hefty price for it not working.

  25. Poptarts Says:

    DTM:
    I think the point many of us are making is that Matt is simply wrong to identify that prior event as “an iteration of the progressive block strategy”.

    It’s only the “progressive block strategy” when it works? When it doesn’t what it is referred to as? The “progressive block fuckup”?

  26. DTM Says:

    [I]n this other, slightly different instance, the strategy did not work and we all paid a hefty price for it not working.

    Sigh. Again, this other instance actually isn’t an example of the strategy not working, because this other instance doesn’t actually embody the strategy in question.

    Here, I will try to make this clear with an analogy.

    Someone says:

    The risk of driving a Chevy is that if someone rearends you, the gasoline tank may rupture and start a deadly fire. That is what happened with Chevies back in the 1970s.

    A second person replies:

    Actually, that happened to Ford Pintos, not Chevies, back in the 1970s.

    A third person jumps in:

    Why are you giving the first person such a hard time? He is just trying to point of there are risks to driving Chevies.

    The second person replies:

    OK, but the risks he mentioned didn’t involve Chevies. Those were Fords.

    The third person insists:

    But look at the heavy price people paid for driving Chevies–their cars blew up!

    The second person responds:

    Sigh. Those were Fords, not Chevies. Here, I will try to make this clear . . .

    Hopefully that helps.

  27. scott Says:

    Re the “every strategy has risks” thought, no one would disagree with that, but the question we’re all interested in is whether the risks that MY cites from his historical example apply to the present. I don’t find his example/analogy all that compelling or comparable, so its value in telling us what we ought to do now is pretty much nil on the merits. So all we’re left with is MY’s rhetorical gesture that We Ought To Think Really Really Carefully Before We Attempt Anything Meaningful. Since the vast majority of Dem politicans and pundits have spent the last 30-40 years telling us that, I don’t find Matt’s rhetorical caution adds much of value.

  28. DTM Says:

    It’s only the “progressive block strategy” when it works?

    Um, no. What Matt identified is a case of people blocking legislation in the hope that a subsequent election will give them a more favorable Congress to work with. That actually has nothing in particular to do with what “progressives” are doing with the health care reform bill today.

    So it is not a question of working or not working. It is a question of Matt simply being wrong when he called this prior case an instance of the current strategy. They really have nothing in particular to do with each other in terms of strategy.

    Indeed, as best I can tell, Matt and now you are insisting these cases involved the same strategy on the sole basis that they both involved health care and people you might call “progressives”. But again, none of that shows the actual strategy in question was the same, and it obviously was not.

  29. LaFollette Progressive Says:

    I’m one of the resident crusaders against bad analogies, but I don’t see any real problems with this post. It’s an imperfect analogy, but he’s using to make a valid and thoroughly banal point: when you spike an imperfect bill in the interest of getting a better deal next year, sometimes next year never comes.

    Matt talks up the “Progressive block” strategy in one post and then highlights the downside risks in the next. Hardly evidence of crypto-Rockefellerism.

    I agree that the Dems should stick to their guns on the public option. We have a Democratic President, strong majorities in both houses that include very few Dixiecrats, and public support. No excuses. But these are DEMOCRATS we’re talking about. And it is, in fact, possible that this strategy will result in failure to pass any sort of health reform bill through the Senate, Republican midterm gains, and another 30 year wait. Pretending otherwise is not helpful.

  30. frankie d Says:

    what matt ignores is that the so-called reform that is barrelling down the tracks will actually put consumers in a worse position, if it is passed.
    listening carefully to what obama has been saying, imho, he would be willing to accept the kind of bill the finance committee is drafting: a bill with mandates, no public option, and no real limitation on how private insurers charge for their services.
    yes, there might be marginal savings, and nominally, no exclusions for pre-existing conditions, but the end result of the type of legislation, obama appears to be heading towards would force consumers, under penalty of law, to purchase health insurance from the same corrupt providers who have been exploiting consumers for decades. what person in their right mind would expect anything different from what has been happening all these years?
    considering what rahm has been saying, and what obama has strongly hinted at, no “reform” would absolutely be better than the supposed reform being offered.

  31. DTM Says:

    [W]hen you spike an imperfect bill in the interest of getting a better deal next year, sometimes next year never comes.

    But that isn’t the strategy in question.

    And it is, in fact, possible that this strategy will result in failure to pass any sort of health reform bill through the Senate . . . .

    OK, but this is the precise problem with using Matt’s analogy to make this point: it is extremely important to note that in the prior case, it was apparently a deliberate part of the strategy to spike the bill. But in this case, that would actually represent a failure of the strategy–indeed, a failure of one of its key premises, which is that the bill is too important to the Democrats as a whole for them to let it fail.

    So OK, if you want to argue that there is some risk of miscalculation, in that maybe some Senate Democrats might actually vote against the bill if it includes something like a public option, then fine. But this prior case isn’t illuminating on that issue, because apparently in this prior case the spiking of the bill wasn’t accidental, it was deliberate.

  32. LaFollette Progressive Says:

    “But that isn’t the strategy in question.”

    It’s not the *intent* of the strategy in question, but if the Baucus bill is the only one that comes up for a vote in this session, and the “Progressive Block” sticks to its guns, then the outcome of the strategy will be to spike a bad bill and try again next year. And ultimately we will judge the strategy by its outcomes, not by its intentions.

    I agree that this is probably not the best example Matt could find. But I think most of his critics in this thread are missing that he’s comparing the potential consequences of the Progressive block strategy to the consequences of the Nixon-era union strategy. He’s not comparing the reasoning behind the strategy.

  33. Th Says:

    A little perspective from an actual old person who worked to get Democrats elected from the ‘68 election on: incrementally better bills were proposed in the years after ‘74 and each was shot down in the hopes of even better until Carter and Kennedy got into a measuring contest. Neither wanted the other to get the credit and either proposal would have been a great step forward. Instead, Kennedy ran against Carter in ‘80, many progressives sat out the Carter/Reagan election or voted for John Anderson and Reagan won. Lesson: take what you can get and improve later if you do get a better congress.

    The progressive caucus holds a winning hand here and should play it out. But don’t blow it all up.

  34. Ted Says:

    Man, the last forty years have sucked.

  35. Ted Says:

    I was born in 68, so I only caught the tail end of the suckage. But someone who was becoming politically active in 68 …

    There ought to be a purple heart or something.

  36. frankie d Says:

    yes, take what you can get, but also never negotiate against yourself and settle for less than what you might be able to get.
    which appears to be the obama modus operandi.
    repeatedly, from the stimulus bill to the current health care debate, the administration appears to be negotiating against itself, repeatedly giving up – or hinting that it will give up – crucial elements of their legislation for….
    what?
    invisible republican votes?
    a more developed reputation as a conciliator?
    its not clear. but their negotiating strategy, so far, has been pathetic.
    unless one assumes that what they really want is a watered-down, insurance company friendly, republican bill, but obviously cannot say so because the democratic base would go crazy.

  37. Paul Camp Says:

    If you don’t stand for something, then you stand for nothing. At some point, your actions have to reflect your beliefs or else you’re just talk.

    I’m glad the progressives drew a line in the sand. The other side of it has to be a directive from Reid that when the leadership files for cloture, you will vote for it. You can then vote however you want on the actual bill.

  38. ron Says:

    Based on his actions (versus talk) and appointments so far, the evidence says that Obama is using Republican and “moderate Democrat” opposition as cover for his non-progressive agenda.

  39. Myles SG Says:

    But then, according to a 1974 political almanac published by Congressional Quarterly, the AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers lobbied successfully to kill the plan.

    HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA UAW HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHA!
    HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAHAHA

    Sorry, couldn’t help it. This is fucking HILARIOUS especially in the current context. UAW HAHAHAHAHAHAHAA!

    What dumb douchebags!!! HAHAHA

  40. DTM Says:

    But I think most of his critics in this thread are missing that he’s comparing the potential consequences of the Progressive block strategy to the consequences of the Nixon-era union strategy. He’s not comparing the reasoning behind the strategy.

    I think you are being too charitable, because that interpretation doesn’t make sense of Matt’s line that “[i]n retrospect, that particular iteration of the progressive block strategy doesn’t look so smart.” I don’t see how that can be read any other way than Matt asserting the same strategic reasoning was being used in the past case.

    In any event, I will agree that if Matt had actually written something like . . .

    Here is a somewhat different strategy, but it led to not getting serious health care reform at all for the next 35 years. And it would be bad if the current strategy had the same effect, so we should try to avoid that outcome.

    . . . his post would have been unobjectionable.

  41. theAmericanist Says:

    Um — why not start with the fact that just because you passed a bill with even a big hole in it this year, doesn’t preclude filling the hole with new legislation NEXT year?

    We gotta get over the idea that all legislation is a one-shot deal.

  42. tropicgirl Says:

    History of the Democratic Party:

    led the extinction of the american indians

    heavily involved in the push AGAINST ENDING slavery

    sided with the slave south for partisan/opportunistic reasons against Lincoln

    championed the removal of rights blacks had won after the civil war (and the nasty groups we all know who) settling into segregationism

    late 1800’s became the champion of big business

    pushed involvement in WW1, the stupidest war ever fought

    invented the cold war threat, opening the door to war once again

    in 1946 failed at universal health care

    1952 began the asian wars that american youth fought which subsequently was continued by them

    many allied with the conservative coalition, beginning in the 1930’s blocking all liberal domestic legislation

    democrats in the south opposed racial integration

    Racist Strom Thurman formed Dixiecrats

    Many became Reagan democrats adopting a conservative platform

    1985 the democratic party decided to move the party to the right

    In 90’s with Clinton, party officially moves further to the right alienating the left again

    Gore’s similarity to Bush caused him to lose election due to Nader vote. Gore since changes and clarifies position

    Democrats wholeheartedly support “war against Muslims” position after possible false flag 911 incident in NYC

    Disgusted people throw out many democratic governors for incompetence in reform in 2000’s

    As a reaction, Democrats move further to the right on gun control and other issues

    Democrats regain losses in house and senate due to left support, not by moving to the center, which kept them a minority for 12 years

    Centrist democratic president elected by “anyone but Bush” emotion and by “utilizing the left”

    After running on a reform platform, Democrats return to the center and codify many of the objectionable positions of the former republican party and George W. Bush.

    Approval ratings going down… prepare to lose Congress and possibly the presidency 2nd term of Obama, due to a viable third party candidate.

  43. DTM Says:

    Personally, I prefer ontopicgirl.

  44. Glen Tomkins Says:

    The difference

    Look, we’re not doing health care financing reform, specifically universal coverage, this year because of the problems that concern progressives, people going without insurance because they either can’t afford it, or they’ve been booted off their plans by insurers for the crime of getting sick. Good luck getting the system to respond to mere humanitarian disasters.

    No, we’re doing health care reform this year because more and more people who could, if only with some difficulty, afford to pay for insurance, choose to go naked because indemnity health insurance has reached a tipping point of simply not being a wise economic choice. The plan of paying out of pocket for medical services from what you save by not paying premiums, and spending down to Medicaid eligibility if you lose the lottery and suffer a true medical catastrophe, doesn’t look so bad when the premiums average near a thousand a month, and even that won’t buy you protection from bankruptcy and Medicaid-dependence in the event of that true medical catastrophe.

    The people who might make this choice to go naked are vital to the health of the industry, because they are the low-risk stalwarts who carry everyone else in the plan, and oh, the folks who profit from the plan as well. If their tendency to defect is not stanched, the industry is doomed. The conventional wisdom is that the industry would prefer the status quo, but actually, a reform plan that forces all of those defectors back into line, as much as possible on the industry’s terms, but at all costs, is the only life line that could save the industry.

    This is not 1974. Universal coverage wasn’t a universal necessity to all the players in 1974. In 2009, universal coverage is a matter of life and death to the people who hire our legislators. They, not us, have to accept whatever plan of universal coverage they can get. Even if that plan is done right and contains a public option that “only” kills them within five years, that’s still more of a reprieve than the status quo offers them. If that weren’t so, health care reform wouldn’t be under serious consideration this year.

  45. A Lesson From An Otherwise Useless Graduate Education « Carrots & Sticks Says:

    [...] A Lesson From An Otherwise Useless Graduate Education Posted July 9, 2009 Filed under: Climate Policy, Health | Tags: healtcare reform, waxman-markey bill | There’s been a lot of talk about the Progressive Block strategy, which states that progressives should team up and threaten to spike a bill if doesn’t meet their minimum demands, because using such a strategy appears close to delivering a much improved health care bill. But, obviously such a strategy can kill a good bill based on the false belief that you can get a better deal in the future. [...]

  46. Nathanael Nerode Says:

    Um, yeah. That sounds like the RIGHT RESULT, Matt. That’s not a danger — that’s a *feature*. The progressive block is clearly the right thing to do!

    If there aren’t enough votes for a real public option, then there aren’t enough votes to get anything useful passed. Better to pass nothing than to pass something like RomneyCare, which imposes a large head tax payable to private companies (!!!).

    So what are you wittering on about?


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