On Afghanistan
A distressing number of people in the comments to this post were not just disagreeing with the things I’ve said about Afghanistan (which is fair enough) but instead asserting that I’ve been failing to address the topic out of some kind of cowardly desire to follow someone else’s lead. If you’re curious, though, you can always check out this list of posts tagged “Afghanistan.”
But to sum up my thoughts, I don’t think we should be heading for the exits in Afghanistan just yet. We have an interest in doing more to fight al-Qaeda and in weaken pro-Qaeda Taliban factions. Meanwhile, public opinion in Afghanistan is still reasonably friendly to the foreign military presence. I do, however, think it’s important that we set ourselves up to end the war sooner rather than later—that means lowering expectations and setting realistic goals.
I don’t know how to evaluate the decision to send more troops to Afghanistan. I’ve heard plausible strategic visions for Afghanistan that involve sending more troops their. But the administration decided to announce the increase in force-levels before announcing the results of their strategic review. That decision about the sequence of events doesn’t seem very smart to me. But the decision about the sequence is going to be much less consequential than the actual results of the review and the most important thing there is going to be goals. I think if we could do history over again, the smart thing to have done would have been to have stayed out of Iraq. Then in 2002 and 2003, when the United States was very popular in Afghanistan we would have had more resources available to provide more comprehensive security and do more comprehensive development. Having made a bad decision to invade Iraq, if we’d started withdrawing from Iraq in early 2005 I think that still would have been soon enough to “go big” in Afghanistan—to send in more resources, more development, and to adopt a deeper, more ambitious, more comprehensive strategy. Even if we’d done what congressional Democrats wanted to and started withdrawing from Iraq in early 2007 this might have worked.
But none of those things happened. Consequently, we reached a point where the Afghan public is losing patience with us. There are things we can do to try to turn that around in the short-run—killing fewer civilians should help—but either way I think it means that we need to start looking for plausible offramps: A relatively narrow set of political and military goals combined with a willingness to cut deals with just about anyone willing to cut deals with us.
27 Responses to “On Afghanistan”
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March 1st, 2009 at 10:51 am
Even though it is a difficult environment, I don’t doubt that if we commit lots of time and resources, we can achieve some sort of limited success. The question I have is, given that the country is landlocked, extremely poor, with no useful natural resources, why is it in our interests to do so?
The only thing I can think of is an explanation of how our involvement in Afghanistan would affect developments in Pakistan, which obviously is strategically important. So, unless you can come up with a rationale for how we can improve the situation in Pakistan by remaining enmeshed in Afghanistan, I just don’t see any good reason for remaining.
March 1st, 2009 at 10:56 am
It’s worth noting that even when all combat troops are withdrawn from Iraq by August 31st, 2010, the United States will still have more troops in Iraq (50,000) than the total NATO currently has in Afghanistan (47,000). Of course, with the 17,000 additional troops that Obama is sending to Afghanistan, this will change. But it gives you an idea of the relative commitment that America has had to each of these wars, bearing in mind that Afghanistan is larger than Iraq both in terms of population and geographic size (33 million people, 650,000 square km vs. 28m people, 440,000 square km).
March 1st, 2009 at 10:58 am
All this hand-wringing about “what to do” in Afghanistan ignores what has always been clear: we never should have gone in there in the first place. No arguments along the lines of, “Well, now that we’re there…” can reverse that, nor can we in our arrogance presume that our continued efforts toward “nation building” will ameliorate the situation. Withdraw already!
March 1st, 2009 at 11:18 am
My main concern about Afghanistan is that I don’t know what our goals are. If the Administration was clearer as to what it was trying to accomplish, I might feel more comfortable with upping the troop levels.
Although I hope what they aren’t planning on doing is punishing poor farmers for growing opium. If the plan on opium is more inline with these suggestions from the Center on International Cooperation (basically, use our resources to go after heroin producers and opium traffickers, but leave the farmers alone until they have more economic options), I’d be supportive. But if we’re going to continue to destroy rural Afghanis’ livelihoods, we’re just going to push them into the arms of the Taliban.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:18 am
Yes, by all means, stay in Afghanistan. We must make the world safe for heroin, of which Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era is the leading producer.
The government is corrupt and incompetent. The warlords rule the provinces, and our supply lines are being cut.
America can’t afford to feed its children. But by all means, shit billions of dollars into a pointless and hopeless military adventure.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:19 am
Maybe Matt should set the over/under on how long the U.S. will be able to keep embassies in Kabul and Baghdad.
I believe that when President Obama leaves office in 2017, the U.S. will no longer have an Embassy in Iraq or Afghanistan since both places will be about as safe as the Somalia of 2009.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:50 am
How can you possibly square your support with the Afghanistan war with your opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:55 am
The war on terror is a sham. Terrorists are criminals and should be treated as such. Our action in Afghanistan is analogous to fighting the Baader-Meinhof gang by attacking Germany.
How much do the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have to do with their locations next to Iran?
March 1st, 2009 at 12:07 pm
This post sounds perfectly reasonable.
As to “why” we’re in Afghanistan, Jim W is right that notice Pakistan — if he is curious as to how we can improve the situation there with a military to the west, I would point out that, among our many key interests in Pakistan, our leading interest (or at least a top one) is their struggle on the western border with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
In the short term, this includes making it difficult for the enemy to use the border to escape them; in the longer term, it means making sure the enemy doesn’t have a failed state to flee to and start all over again.
Now there are other reasons the Obama administration doesn’t want a failed state in Afghanistan, to be sure. But this, in addition to being a (the?) leading reason, is the the continuation of why America is in Afghanistan in the first place. (This continuity between “why we invaded” and “why we remain” stands in marked contrast to, say, Iraq.)
March 1st, 2009 at 12:19 pm
Nations that achieve some degree of hegemony always seem to over-extend themselves: Rome, Spain, Britain, Napoleanic France, etc.
March 1st, 2009 at 1:00 pm
I think there is one thing that will pretty much guarantee we lose in Afghanistan: if we wage the “War on Drugs” against the Taliban. How about if we declare a medical exemption for Afghan heroin? That way, Afghan farmers wouldn’t be driven into the arms of the Taliban.
March 1st, 2009 at 1:09 pm
Another content-less post from Matt on Afghanistan.
He admits he doesn’t even know how to consider the troop “surge”.
Well, that seem to be equivalent with his inability to provide anything but some wishful thinking masquerading as a goal that “somehow” we can prevent a failed state that has the ability to harbor terrorists.
As for Pakistan, even more handwaving. The notion that the US can do ANYTHING in Pakistan to make the government ascendant over a tribal area that has NEVER been controlled by the government any more than Afghanistan has is a joke.
More massive ignorance on a foreign policy topic would be hard to find.
March 1st, 2009 at 2:01 pm
You’re right, but I think it’s at least possible that you’re understating a very valid case due to pressures on pundits and journalists to support not American soldiers, but American political decisions to deploy them.
What we lazily refer to as “The Taliban” is not an army. It is a loosely affiliated group of political/religious ideological movements. The idea that “The Taliban” can be “defeated” by an army is just prima facie ludicrous, somewhat as if you thought you could use military force to defeat Libertarianism.
Similarly, al-Quaeda does not lend itself to defeat by a large military force. They are small groups of dangerous extremists mixed in with assorted hangers on, and they will never choose to fight a pitched battle. The solution to trans national terrorism has been well understood for decades, it was only the war-mad political leadership of the last eight years that managed to muddy those previously clear waters.
Will the American forces work to eradicate the poppy crop? That will be monumentally stupid, as what will result is that tens of thousands of poor farmers will be made destitute. And they will turn to the insurgents for services, and those services will be provided. If there is any serious adherence to these updated COIN strategies I keep hearing so much about, you’ve got to replace the income and the services BEFORE you eliminate the cash crop, and in today’s reality we know that simply isn’t going to happen.
It’s time to get the US forces out of South Asia, and work with the government to provide education, heath care, economic and agricultural support, and let intel and law enforcement handle the terror threat. How we could live in a world where this is not obvious is simply amazing to me…
mikey
March 1st, 2009 at 3:15 pm
posted 2/17/09 5:01pm
“To remain effective in Afghanistan, we desperately need to reduce the civilian death toll. That means less airstrikes. Which probably means more boots on the ground. And hopefully more boots on the ground can also reduce civilian exposure to death-by-Taliban. That’d be how you get the job done.
And hopefully that’s what’s in store for these additional troops.”
I’ve read your blog everyday for a few years now, and I have to ask you a question in response to the above post: How recently have you spoken with a recruiter to determine if you are physically, medically, mentally and morally qualified to enlist?
March 1st, 2009 at 4:42 pm
it’s pretty clear he’s not physically qualified to enlist.
March 1st, 2009 at 5:18 pm
“All this hand-wringing about “what to do” in Afghanistan ignores what has always been clear: we never should have gone in there in the first place.” –Peter
What makes an Afghanistan under totalitarian gangsters and harboring international terrorists superior to an Afghanistan under a comparatively secular, corrupt and inept democracy? Yes, there is a civil war in Afghanistan today. Yes, there are vicious warlords and internecine conflict. But all of this was true for the Taliban as well, but you could add religious fascism on top of all that.
“Although I hope what they aren’t planning on doing is punishing poor farmers for growing opium… (basically, use our resources to go after heroin producers and opium traffickers, but leave the farmers alone until they have more economic options), I’d be supportive. But if we’re going to continue to destroy rural Afghanis’ livelihoods, we’re just going to push them into the arms of the Taliban.” –Satori
You’re right to say punishing Afghans for growing opium is a horrible policy, but I’m not sure about your solution. Maybe I’m misunderstanding you, but if you are suggesting we should keep the drug war going in any fashion, I would beg to differ. Whatever Afghanistan’s old cash crop used to be (it was like figs or something) takes about a decade to grow. Most if not all of their crops have been destroyed by conflict. Afghanistan’s land is notoriously difficult for agriculture. Poppies are pretty much the only thing that will earn the vast majority of Afghans money to live on. So, if they must grow poppies, it must be legal, otherwise Kabul will never be seen as legitimate. If we don’t want the poppies going to heroin and opium, we can do what we do with Turkey and buy it for our morphine supplies.
“America can’t afford to feed its children. But by all means, shit billions of dollars into a pointless and hopeless military adventure.” –Skeptic
Oh, please. We can’t afford to feed our children? You cannot honestly be comparing the living conditions of one of the world’s richest, most technologically advanced states (and the only remaining super power at that) with the living conditions of a rural, medieval backwater that is both being simultaneously occupied by a foreign power and engaged in a civil war. Er, can you?
“How can you possibly square your support with the Afghanistan war with your opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza.” –joe
Obviously we didn’t occupy Afghanistan before 9/11.
“The war on terror is a sham. Terrorists are criminals and should be treated as such. Our action in Afghanistan is analogous to fighting the Baader-Meinhof gang by attacking Germany.
How much do the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have to do with their locations next to Iran?” –ron
The Iran point makes little sense. You know they helped us invade Afghanistan, right? And it’s no secret that Iran was pleased with the geopolitics of the Iraq war (it destroyed their regional nemesis and closest geopolitical threat, replaced an old suni-dominated regime with a fellow shiite one, and gave Iran an opportunity to bleed the US dry and run out the clock on inspections).
That said, the war on terrorism is most definitely a sham in that you can’t have a war on a tactic in any meaningful sense (war on guerrilla warfare anyone?). But this is largely due to the politics of language. We are not waging a war on terrorism, we are taking sides in a civil war within Islam. I wonder how you might cram that into a marketable phrase?
March 1st, 2009 at 5:32 pm
Just to note: the two post by “James” are by two different commenters.
In response to the second: Ok. I’m not aware of that to which you refer. But if that’s the case and it’s personal, then I’m satisfied.
March 1st, 2009 at 6:08 pm
“Meanwhile, public opinion in Afghanistan is still reasonably friendly to the foreign military presence”
The levels cited in that link are roughly the same magnitude that were said to be a good reason to pull the US Navy out of Persian gulf.
“I do, however, think it’s important that we set ourselves up to end the war sooner rather than later”
Because everyone at the Pentagon loves to make wars go on as long as possible. It makes recruiting, retention and sustainment so much easier.
“I don’t know how to evaluate the decision to send more troops to Afghanistan”
Aren’t you a self-described foreign policy wonk? Isn’t this the most important decision facing the Obama administration right now? (esp with the Iraq endgame clearly defined?)
“f we’d started withdrawing from Iraq in early 2005″
But we didn’t so it doesn’t frakin matter. What matters are the plans and the decisions going forward.
“we need to start looking for plausible offramps”
But “don’t think we should be heading for the exits in Afghanistan just yet.”
Ok, thanks for clearing that up.
Based on one of your links this appears to be your central thesis of what are goal in Afghanistan should be:
which is fair enough. But if that’s your criteria, there are other countries that arguably meet it. And yet, I presume you’re not so keen on invading and clearing out these elements from these other countries.
It’s also arguable that as far a limited aims of clearing out the terrorist safe haven for basing operations *against the United States*, we have a ‘mission accomplished.’ Afghanistan will be ill suited to serve as a base for preparing for attacks on the United States in the foreseeable future, even if we were to leave tomorrow. Now if I lived in India, or even Pakistan for that matter, I would be somewhat concerned, but I am relatively certain the ability to do anything against the US is very constrained at this point.
March 1st, 2009 at 8:50 pm
Great post, Matt. Don’t let the red-faced screamers get you down!
Something that always frustrates me about this discussion – as with the discussion circa 2006 regarding Iraq – is that withdrawal and the pursuit of our goals are always set up in opposition.
In fact, in both circumstances, the announcement, formulation, execution, and completion of our policy of disengagement should itself be treated as an arrow in our quiver. Look at Anbar Provice, where the local yokels just happened to decide they hated the foreign jihadists at exactly the same time that we ceased to try to occupy and administer the area. Rather than this being an astounding coincidence, it’s better understood as an indication that our withdrawal has the potential to influence internal political dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan in positive ways.
March 1st, 2009 at 9:16 pm
I see a big error, a misunderstanding, repeated by several commenters.
The question I have is, given that the country is landlocked, extremely poor, with no useful natural resources, why is it in our interests to do so?
Terrorists are criminals and should be treated as such. Our action in Afghanistan is analogous to fighting the Baader-Meinhof gang by attacking Germany.
What we lazily refer to as “The Taliban” is not an army. It is a loosely affiliated group of political/religious ideological movements. The idea that “The Taliban” can be “defeated” by an army is just prima facie ludicrous, somewhat as if you thought you could use military force to defeat Libertarianism.
Similarly, al-Quaeda does not lend itself to defeat by a large military force. They are small groups of dangerous extremists mixed in with assorted hangers on, and they will never choose to fight a pitched battle.
Before we went to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban was that nation’s government, the Taliban army was the national army, and they had the territory, resources, and prerogatives of a sovereign government. Since bin Laden went to Afghanistan, showered the Taliban with money, married Mullah Omar’s daughter, et cetera, al Qaeda’s leadership were virtual partners in that sovereign government, al Qaeda’s military/terrorist wing were using Afghan territory as the base of operations for a global campaign of violence, and the government of Afghanistan was using their power to shield them. This is not remotely the same thing as some terrorists living under ground in Germany, or setting up camps outside the reach of the government in some other country.
Kolohe declares “Mission Accomplished” because the Northern Alliance and American troops successfully removed the Taliban from power and routed the Taliban army and al Qaeda from Afghan territory – which they did – but I don’t understand his certainty that they wouldn’t just retake the country if NATO left. They did it before.
I think our mission needs to be to leave in place a political and military situation that will prevent al Qaeda from again enjoying the use of Afghan territory and a friendly government in Kabul. (This, btw, is quite different from Iraq, where there was NEVER a possibility that an indigenous Iraqi government would either be unable to assert control over its territory and therefore allow a jihadist group to establish a safe haven, or that such jihadists would actually take control of the country. Unlike the various Afghan governments throughout the ages, Baghdad has always been able to exert control over the hinterlands, and the local political culture was never friendly with jihadists – except for the period of our occupation, that is. Afghanistan is quite a different story.)
Now, I’m certainly not adhering to a Rumsfeld-era “we keep killing bad guyz till we kill the Big Bad Guy on Level 29, and then Victory!” theory here. We can’t achieve these goals by winning battles – but that’s not to say we can’t influence the situation in ways that advance our interest in denying the al Qaedists control and freedom of operation. For starters, we need to stabilize the deteriorating military situation, but that’s just putting out a fire. In the medium and long term, we need to foster a political solution – which will probably involve reaching an understanding with some local a-holes who beat women for not wearing burkhas, as unpleasant as that is to contemplate – that strengthens the central government’s standing in the provinces, so that local leaders will choose to ally themselves with Karzai, or whomever, instead of bin Laden.
March 1st, 2009 at 9:27 pm
Or, what Stephen Harper said.
March 1st, 2009 at 10:03 pm
but I don’t understand his certainty that they wouldn’t just retake the country if NATO left. They did it before.
Only a mere seven years after the Russians pulled out direct support and five years after all indirect support left because the Russians had other things that required their attention. I posit a Taliban resurgence (to the point it’s able to take over the whole country) will be a similar Austin Powers steamroller.
We pull out* and we’ll still be paying attention. And we will not be quite so distracted. Plus, the Taliban’s former main patrons – Wahabist elements of the Saudi government and Pakistani intelligence – can’t or won’t be giving overt support like they did in the 90’s.
* and I’m not even saying we should. I’m saying that I’ve read all the posts tagged Afghanistan and aside from the blockquote I used above, I failed to find any central organizing principle. Just vague statements about ‘lowering expectations’ and ‘redefining goals’ plus somewhat clearer statements that McCain, Palin and of course Bush suck. (quelle surprise)
March 1st, 2009 at 10:16 pm
Baghdad has always been able to exert control over the hinterlands
I suppose it depends what you mean by ‘throughout the ages’. It was explicitly not able to do so from ‘91 to ‘03 by UN & US design. It was able to do so during pre-’91 Sadam with some rather thorough brutality. I’d have to look up what happened before that.
March 1st, 2009 at 10:18 pm
not that i fundamentally disagree with your Iraq point; any and all trouble in the region from Iraq (except for the PKK after ‘98) would come from Sadam’s regime and any potential successor, which was more boxed in than a number 7.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:09 pm
Matt,
Frankly their loss of patience, and how it limits what can be achieved there and what future troubles may arise from there, are far more relevant than the loss of patience of your reading public for the war.
March 1st, 2009 at 11:12 pm
Kolohe,
I wrote …except for the period of our occupation… to make exactly that point.
March 2nd, 2009 at 3:21 am
Again: Rory Stewart. Give him a fucking call, Matt.