Crisis and the American Way
Noam Scheiber says “our political system isn’t ideally suited to dealing with financial and economic crises.” Ezra Klein disagrees and says we deal fine with crises, the problem “is long-term crises like global warming or health costs.”
I think this misunderstands the force of the point. No political system deals well with problems where short-term pain can provide long-term gain, or where concentrated benefits are set against diffuse costs. But the U.S. political system, with its high number of veto points, is arguably unsuited to taking decisive action in response to a crisis compared to alternative models, such as the Westminster system in play in the United Kingdom and Canada or to the multiparty coalition systems of northern Europe. It’s hard to know how to evaluate that claim. There is, however, a political science literature indicating that American-style systems are more prone to total constitutional breakdown in a crisis.
Certainly the American system doesn’t appear to have been designed with an aim to facilitating a decisive response in a crisis situation. Instead, it does two things very well. One—one of its primary purposes—is to protect private property within the confined of a system of representative government. Compared to other advanced democracies, the United States has lower taxes, a smaller welfare state, less regulation, etc., and this is not an accident. The other major virtue of our system is that it knits a very diverse country together into two broad, loose coalitions. If we had an Israeli (or Dutch or Swiss or…) coalition-based system, then we might have an incredible spectrum of regional or ethnic parties as new immigrant groups formed new identity-based parties rather than joining establishment “machines.”
21 Responses to “Crisis and the American Way”
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March 17th, 2009 at 9:44 am
there’s also a fatal problem with the american system, in that the only kind of crisis it is designed to address is a military one.
in general, the system was meant to be slow, deliberative, and dominated by the legislature. the exception was the provision of a standing army, and the permanent designation of the president as the ‘commander in chief’ of the army and navy. this was meant for exactly those military crises–invasions, rebellions, etc.–where the slow pace of legislative deliberation, with its multiple veto-points, would not meet the exigencies of instant peril.
unfortunately, this root asymmetry–lethargic in peace, but energetic in war– has meant that unscrupulous zealots of executive expansion have realized that the way to gain concentrated power is to embroil the country in wars. they can trample down all checkpoints and opposition by creating a military crisis.
i for one would not like to see the country move towards a westminster system. if you thought bush’s eight-year experiment with tyranny was nightmarish, only imagine it extended to all aspects of governmental activity. he could have destroyed social security as easily as he led us off to war. as it was, the asymmetry worked to preserve social security; it is not so easy to respond to crisis in domestic affairs as in military ones, but it is also not so easy to create spurious ones and ride roughshod over opposition.
(though at least the westminster system comes with the possibility of no-confidence votes).
March 17th, 2009 at 10:06 am
I think Matt is leaving out one very important purpose of our system and that was to appease an existing power structure. That is why we had a 3/5 compromise when slaves would have been better served by not being counted at all (a point some people seem to confuse). Its also why states receive two senators regardless of their population.
I think we should abolish the electoral college, end the filibuster, and find some way to overcome the bias toward states with small populations. I do wonder though why it is that states with small populations don’t see their populations increase over time as people move to subsidized parts of the country. Alaska’s climate really sucks, but why don’t people move in large numbers to Idaho and Montana?
March 17th, 2009 at 10:32 am
“Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato’s. No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary.
In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.”
Aristotle, Politics
March 17th, 2009 at 10:40 am
I do wonder though why it is that states with small populations don’t see their populations increase over time as people move to subsidized parts of the country.
What subsidies? I mean, do such things already exist? If so, they’d have to be massive to get a significant number of people to uproot and move. OTOH, if you’re saying that rural states should create those subsidies, there’s an obvious political barrier to it: just try selling an expensive social engineering project like that to a right-wing state legislature.
March 17th, 2009 at 10:51 am
Matt’s dreams of eliminating the Constitution continue to distract the blog from real issues, so really a first-year civic lesson might be a good investment for a blogger. If it helps, the Constitution was designed to provide checks and balances in order to reduce the chance of abuse and tyranny. However, it was also designed to increase federal powers, so that something would actually get done, unlike in the crisis it was resolving at the time.
The idea, again as explained again by Cass Sunstein this month in NYRB, was that power left to smaller blocks would devolve into factions and inability to deal at all. This is relevant to the criticism just yesterday that maybe structural issues make the U.S. but not Europe able to cope.
Now, Matt is not entirely unwise to distrust there that political rather than structural obstacles are key. So why can’t he think about that here, too? The Constitution didn’t give the shift in the last two generations to congressional rules requiring a supermajority to go to the toilet. It didn’t give the shift in the same time from a Democratic majority coalition of liberals and Dixiecrats that could be counted on to work together from time to time when civil rights wasn’t involved, plus a Republican coalition of big business and social moderates, to today’s ideologically rigid right-wing party, as much able to cause trouble as in Germany between the wars. It didn’t give the rise of the Democratic party of circular firing squads, only abetted by the blogosphere, like this post.
March 17th, 2009 at 10:54 am
“The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.
For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advantages.
Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name- a constitution.
And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.
Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy.
For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy:
none of them the common good of all. ”
Aristotle, Politics
March 17th, 2009 at 11:38 am
Turned on the TeeVee this morning to catch the weather and there was Tommy Friedman talking about the AIG crisis.
He’d hit upon a blood transfusion as a metaphor for the government keeping AIG alive.
He seemed pretty pleased with his metaphor, judging by how he kept repeating it.
He seemed to think that by coming up with his deep insight, he’d solved the problem.
Maybe we should just be like Tom and lower the bar for what a successful “dealing with” a problem is?
March 17th, 2009 at 12:23 pm
“If we had an Israeli (or Dutch or Swiss or…) coalition-based system, then we might have an incredible spectrum of regional or ethnic parties as new immigrant groups formed new identity-based parties rather than joining establishment ‘machines.’”
Or alternatively, we would have sought to keep said identity-based parties from emerging by keeping the immigrants from coming here in the first place — we’d have a greater incentive to, since the new populations would have the option of not assimilating, and the incentive to let said identity determine their politics.
Which is a long way of saying that the diversity of the United States is no accident either.
March 17th, 2009 at 12:31 pm
No democracy is particularly well-designed to deal with problems beyond the horizon of the term of elected officials, but because the terms of the elected officials of the US government are fixed and relatively long, I think it translates to better short term crisis management. As others have noted, just look at what is happening in Europe as governments are unable or unwilling to deal with unpopular but necessary stimulus measures, whereas in the US politicians are better able to take a hit now in the hopes that the economy will recover sufficiently by the end of their terms that people will have forgotten the unpopular stimulus vote.
I think the place where you most see the consequences of parliamentary coalitions is Israel, where the possibility of a no-confidence vote or a fractured coalition can occur at any time. Their leaders neither have the time nor can risk the possibility of unpopular-but-necessary compromise for long term gain. The result is a perpetual simmering crisis that their government is chronically unable to address with long term goals or even four-years ahead goals in mind.
March 17th, 2009 at 12:52 pm
Not true RE: political science literature.
Our system is designed specifically to only allow sweeping change during crisis situations. The veto points are put in place to maintain the status quo, but dramatic change can occur one of two ways:
1) A crisis situation overcomes the normal veto points.
2) The status quo finds itself outside the new winset formed by the veto players
Also, Congress frequently casts aside the rules when it sees an interest in doing so (see Barbara Sinclair’s Unorthodox Lawmaking)
The failure of presidential systems on the other hand has more to do with the relationship between the legislature and the executive (see Shugart and Carey).
The more powerful the legislative body is, the less likely you will end up with a failed democracy. We have one of the most powerful legislatures in a presidential system, which is why America hasn’t had a “failure”…yet anyway.
March 17th, 2009 at 1:20 pm
There is, however, a political science literature indicating that American-style systems are more prone to total constitutional breakdown in a crisis.
Some references would be helpful to so large a claim, but my suspicion would be that any analysis examining “American-style systems” would be heavily biased by the fact that most such systems are in Latin American developing countries while most alternative systems are in Western Europe.
March 17th, 2009 at 1:21 pm
But the U.S. political system, … is arguably unsuited to taking decisive action in response to a crisis compared to alternative models, such as the Westminster system in play in the United Kingdom and Canada or to the multiparty coalition systems of northern Europe.
I’m sorry, but I don’t think the facts support that statement. The U.S. weathers crises quite well and much better than most other countries.
And we actually do have apples-to-apples comparisons of how the U.S. deals with crises compared to other countries. Not the least is our current economic crisis, which is global. Have the European multiparty coalitions solved this yet? Even Krugman gives the U.S. high marks relative to the actions of the rest of the world.
This idea about the inferiority of the U.S. constitutional system has been a fixation of yours for a long time now. Shouldn’t you come up with an argument that has some specifics behind it?
March 17th, 2009 at 2:03 pm
Re alphie at 11: “Turned on the TeeVee this morning to catch the weather and there was Tommy Friedman talking about the AIG crisis.
He’d hit upon a blood transfusion as a metaphor for the government keeping AIG alive.”
—————
Giving a depraved junkie a shot of heroin would be a better analogy.
March 17th, 2009 at 3:09 pm
John H:
I suspect that Matt has taken first year civics. That does not mean that he cannot question the effectiveness of the design or the tradeoffs that it creates. I think you labor under the impression that our civics curriculum is set up by omniscient beings.
Now, I don’t have a strong opinion on U.S. vs. Westminster system because I haven’t looked into a good comparison of them yet, but I do think that it’s a topic worth discussing and passing the discussion off as being the talk of those who haven’t taken civics is disingenuous and intellectually corrosive.
March 18th, 2009 at 4:45 am
How come the Alaskan climate sucks? As far as I understand, the Southern parts of the state have a nice, mild maritime climate. You get snow in the Winter and the Summer is not too hot. There’s enough rainfall to keep the natural vegetation growing throughout the warm season. Compared to Los Angeles area, which is awfully hot and dry, that’s a heaven on earth.
Then again, I’m from Finland. So that’s probably skewing my preferences.
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