Iraq’s Still Unreconciled Political Conflicts
CAP’s Brian Katulis offers his take on what the past weekend’s crack in the edifice of sectarian relations in Iraq:
The stated goal of the surge, according to the Bush administration, was to reduce violence in order to help Iraq’s political factions bridge their divides over power, but that has simply not occurred in a meaningful way. Iraq remains plagued by enduring political divisions, as I argued last September in a paper on Iraq’s political transition after the surge.
A key tactic used in the Iraq surge could essentially be likened to what was done in the run-up to the current financial and banking crisis in the United States—steps were taken to make things look better than they actually were, while real problems lurked beneath unaddressed. A day of reckoning must at some point occur, because the structural imbalances of power in Iraq will naturally address themselves, as sure as the force of gravity that keeps us all sitting in our chairs. The inexorable force in Iraq is demographics. Iraq is a Shia-majority country now governed by Shia factions, with nominal participation by Sunni forces. This represents a fundamental shift from the balance of power during decades of Saddam Hussein’s rule, which ended nearly six years ago. Ever since his regime’s ouster in 2003, the fundamental story has been one in which Iraqis adjust themselves to the new reality of Shia rule in Iraq.
This weekend’s incident was the first crack in a shaky foundation constructed by the 2007 surge of U.S. troops—a foundation that largely glossed over long-standing political rivalries. And frankly this tension between the central government and these independent militia groups is less dangerous than the growing tensions between Arab and Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.
As if often the case in Iraq, one can read this two ways. The potential deterioration in the situation could be used as a pretext to backslide on the Obama administration’s commitment to abide by the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement and leave Iraq. Alternatively, you could see the continuing unstable nature of the Iraqi polity as a reason that we shouldn’t be endlessly optimistic about the idea that tens of thousands of U.S. troops can stay in Iraq safely. Personally, I’m inclined toward the second reading. But the point is about larger strategic vision—some see it as in American interests to maintain a large military force in Iraq come what may; others, the people who are right about this, see that idea as contrary to our interests. Either way, it’s useful to recall that despite “surge” triumphalism, the bulk of the underlying issues in Iraq remain unresolved.
10 Responses to “Iraq’s Still Unreconciled Political Conflicts”
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March 30th, 2009 at 6:16 pm
The surge was pointless.
Adding 12% to a grossly undermanned force structure and committing temporarily to meet factional demands for backsheesh allows you to kick up the hocus pocus machine back home. For a spell.
The surge put a band-aid on a cancer patient. That is all.
March 30th, 2009 at 7:09 pm
Precisely the right word, Max. Pointless.
The troops accomplished their tactical goals phenomenally. Damn, we have an awesome military.
But there’s no there there. Those tactical successes were supposed to bring about a strategic goal, but there was no way that they could, because those tactical goals had nothing to do with achieving a political deal among the Iraqi factions.
March 30th, 2009 at 9:25 pm
The troops accomplished their tactical goals phenomenally. Damn, we have an awesome military.
I could be totally wrong, and I don’t have links, but my general understanding of the surge was that the tactical goals of the U.S. troops specifically was pretty limited. Baghdad was pacified by acquiescing in ethnic cleaning of neighborhoods and hardening the divisions with physical barriers. And elsewhere we bought off our adversaries with weapons and cash.
March 30th, 2009 at 11:14 pm
Agreed Joe. The military in the field (the Army and Marines, the other two get half the budget but are nothing but high cost adjuncts in this struggle )from the two stars down has for the most part done honorable and gritty work in absurd conditions.
The top brass and the pencil pushers in the Pentagon are a different story.
March 30th, 2009 at 11:25 pm
Fairly limited, compared to what, Michael S.?
Seemed complicated enough to me.
I mean, it wasn’t Normandy, but it wasn’t escorting a homecoming float, either.
March 31st, 2009 at 12:42 am
The tactical goal, Michael, as I understand it, was actually far reaching.
Get combat teams out from behind the barricades and have them patrol neighborhoods like cops walking the beat. Pay off local warlords not to ambush these teams.
The combat teams establish a rapport with the locals. If the payoffs hold and spontaneous firefights become a thing of the past these combat teams will come to be viewed as friendly fellows out for a coordinated stroll, albeit with lethal firepower. The illusion of safety they initially brought to the neighborhood gives way to reality.
With relatively safe streets the social and economic infra-structure of the country can begin to flower. Any faction that breaks the tacit agreement between the multiple parties involved can be, for the first time, identified and branded as the bad guys. By consensus of the multiple parties the bad guys will be condemned and ruthlessly eliminated.
In the last phase, the Iraqi government takes over our function, and patrols and bribes its way to national stability. Then our forces make a proud and composed march from Baghdad to Basra and board ships for home.
March 31st, 2009 at 7:03 am
Joe, limited in the sense that the surge troops’ mission was not classically military in nature. How awesome did they have to be in order to convince insurgent groups to accept American weapons and cash for their own use?
March 31st, 2009 at 8:14 am
During the Bush administration, I was always amazed at the lack of engaging with the Iraqis at any avenue other than the military. There never were any city planning types helping rebuild the cities (heck, they didn’t even have building codes so that our troops were safe from electrocution). There were no economists helping Iraq develop an oil revenue sharing plan (just Bush’s pals like Hunt who tried to make a side deal with the Kurds and so ended talks in Bagdad). No legal experts helping the fledgling govermnent. Just Bremer’s CPA acting like a giant ATM for KBR, Blackwater, etc.
And it does not appear that Obama or Clinton are attempting to do anything differently with negotiations or diplomacy, other than the disposition of military forces.
What a pathetic waste is the whole endeavor.
March 31st, 2009 at 10:26 am
Re: keeping our troops safe from electrocution
KBR, Blackwater, etc … the Mercenaries, should be allowed one function. Peeling potatoes.
April 9th, 2009 at 5:08 am
This is very up-to-date information. I think I’ll share it on Twitter.