Iraqi Self-Identification
Via John Sides, an article by Mansoor Moaddel, Mark Tessler, and Ronald Inglehart contains among other things this graph showing Iraqi self-ascriptions by ethnic and sectarian group:
The surge in adopting a primary identification as “Iraqi” among Iraqi Arabs is very interesting and it seems plausible to speculate that this played a role in the declining level of sectarian violence starting in the latter half of 2007. Alternatively, it may have been caused by the spike in violence seen during 2006 and early 2007 that may have launched an anti-sectarian backlash.
But Iraqi Kurds evidently have a very different relationship with Iraqi identity than do Iraqi Arabs. The issue of Kurdish independence has stayed quiet, with the Kurds too prudent to do anything unduly provocative and the Iraqi state too weak to make any effort to actually govern in Kurdistan. But the better things get in Iraq, the more these sorts of issues will come to the forefront.
30 Responses to “Iraqi Self-Identification”
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January 6th, 2009 at 12:29 pm
The correct title for the post is “Irak über alles.”
January 6th, 2009 at 12:43 pm
I’m utterly speechless.
January 6th, 2009 at 12:43 pm
What’s a Kurd, anyway?
January 6th, 2009 at 12:53 pm
I’d find it slightly likelier that Matt has the right sequence of events, but that’s not important. The key thing is that the Kurds aren’t buying into any of it, and will probably bust off as soon as they think they can.
We need to have talks with Turkey, Iran, and the Kurds and we need to have them five years ago.
January 6th, 2009 at 1:18 pm
Just for the record, the chart starts from the middle of the occupation and well into a multi-tiered resistance. It may well begin at the height of resistance feelings.
A more balanced assessment would include data points going back as early as possible to the beginning of the occupation or even prior – March 2003.
Also, we don’t really have much of an idea as to the constituencies represented. Does this poll represent citizens of Baghdad mainly? Or Baghdad and a couple of cities? Or does it purport to be a general survey of the whole country? Does that survey include the four million refugees? I dunno….
The first data point seems to come in November 2004, which interestingly, coincides with the American election, the Fallujah mini-state and the second failed compaign against Sadr. I’d have to go back and look at the timeline, but I think that during this time, Bremer was still running Iraq, there was no meaningful self-government and the Sunnis had largely been excluded from any political process. This is when I would expect ‘national sentiment’ to be at its lowest ebb.
Indeed, this is where I’d expect an ‘artificial depression’, ie, stressful conditions leaving the population more focused on ethnic divisions and less on national identification than would be normal. An artificial depression remains as long as the conditions keeping it in place remain or worsen, left to themselves, they go back to the old level.
The second data point seems to be March/April 2006. Remarkably, there’s been very little to no change. Also remarkable, the Shia and Sunni communities pace each other, which suggests that they’re either responding to parallel developments or to each other.
Two more data points in March and June 2007, seem to show a substantial upwards change. Is this meaningful? I don’t know, we don’t have enough of a baseline, we don’t have enough data points.
There are some things that occur during this time period – first, there’s the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad and the effective Shiite domination of the country – their identification as Iraqi nationalists increase because they own the place now. In a sense, this is a bad thing. If the Shiites take the view that the whole lock stock and kaboodle belongs to them, that there’s a greater Iraq, an Iraqi nation, and they run it now… well, tough titty for the Kurds and Sunnis, its their turn under the boot heel.
Second, the other major political development was the Sunnis somewhat unwelcome entry into the political process. This is significant, the Sunnis had previously boycotted elections, resulting in Shiite dominated provincial governments in areas where Shiites were a minority, and in Shiite representation in normally Sunni areas. The Sunni started voting again, which erodes a lot of Shiite gains in certain areas. There was also the awakening movement, which is emerging as a leadership challenge to the Shiite rulership… something both the Shiites and Sunnis recognize.
The re-entry of the Sunni into the political process, and their effort to establish an alternative political structure essentially means that they’re on a collision course again with the Shiites.
But really, the graph is simply useless, it’s unwise to draw inferences from it or put too much weight on it. It’s just another one of those meaningless panglossian factoids.
January 6th, 2009 at 1:23 pm
I really, really, really have to emphasize that we need to be extremely cautious in reading or putting any weight on data like this. The data itself is so thin, it is so sketchy and sparse, it is vulnerable to so many input influences, designer bias, and the results are so open to diverse interpretations that any conclusions must be as tentative and abstract as a condom made of kleenex.
Really, this is dubious stuff.
January 6th, 2009 at 1:25 pm
“We need to have talks with Turkey, Iran, and the Kurds and we need to have them five years ago.”
Certainly, but I’d add Syria to the talks. Any kind of “grand bargain” will involve complicated water rights. The Euphrates flows through Syria and will obviously be a major point of contention. There is no water deal without Syria. These talks need to get going soon before the Kurds act unilaterally.
January 6th, 2009 at 1:31 pm
“Really, this is dubious stuff.”
With the exception of the Kurds, you’re right. But in the elections held in Kurdistan, there have been non-binding referendums on Kurdish independence. Independence has consistently won by margins consistent with the graph (6-8 to 1). And with elections, we’re talking very large sample sizes and very explicit questions. The Kurdish part of the graph is accurate, and it’s the scary part.
January 6th, 2009 at 2:09 pm
I have a theory for how to handle Kurdista- er, that is, that northern area of Iraq:
Leave things on the ground as they are, and put John Kerry in charge of ariticulating their formal legal status.
That ought to buy us 15 years, minimum.
January 6th, 2009 at 2:39 pm
But with respect to the Kurds, we’re not looking at anything new.
January 6th, 2009 at 2:53 pm
“But with respect to the Kurds, we’re not looking at anything new.”
Well, unless you consider the early Ottoman Empire to be new. They’ve wanted independence for centuries.
January 6th, 2009 at 2:53 pm
I read this as the Shia and Sunnis thinking they are each in position to take control of Iraq as soon as we are out of the way and the Kurds planning to remain independent.
January 6th, 2009 at 3:14 pm
Those Iraqis are sure lucky that Bush had the balls to go through with the surge strategy, when erstwhile war supporters like Matt were running for the exits.
January 6th, 2009 at 3:39 pm
But the better things get in Iraq, the more these sorts of issues will come to the forefront.
Or, to put it another way: the current problems will fade soon, but don’t worry, there are plenty more coming.
That sounds snarkier than it’s meant to be.
January 6th, 2009 at 3:48 pm
ROTFL! Yeah, the surge strategy.
Honestly, this if funny as hell. Some squinty eyed retard comes along mumbling ‘the surge worked!’
So you point out that the ‘Awakening Councils’ appear to be made up of former Baathists and local dignitaries under the Saddam Hussein regime;
That as many as half of the ‘Awakening Councils’ forces were previously launching direct attacks on Americans and the other half were supporting them;
That the ‘Awakening Councils’ have said outright that they have no loyalty to the Baghdad central government, and that the Baghdad government has consistently opposed their establishment as private armies antagonistic to the government.
That the ‘Awakening Council’ movement’s loyalty seems entirely dependent on regular bags of cash from the USA, and any time the cash flow slows down the violence starts up again.
That in Baghdad, violence eased off because the Shiites literally ran out of Sunnis to kill. Indeed, the surge in Baghdad actually made it easier for the Shiites to kill or drive off Sunnis. The only ones left there are literally huddling in fortified neighborhoods.
That as a result of wholesale ethnic cleansing of the south and Baghdad, there are some four million refugees inside and outside the country, with no sign of any of them being able to return home. Does four million refugees sound like success?
LOL. But hey, let’s explain it in Vietnam terms: It’s like we handed over the northern provinces to the NVA on the understanding that they’d purge the Vietcong for us, while turning a blinde eye to the Khmer Rouge taking over Saigon and killing off or driving off half the city. Meanwhile, Thailand has decided to bomb Cambodia at will, and we can’t do more than whine about it. And to top it all off, our effort at elections has produced a Vietnamese government which is controlled by a former Chinese Communist puppet political organization.
Jesus, but it’s Hilarious. It’s the dumbest thing I’ve ever heard. People in other countries look at this and they double over laughing. The Russians can’t believe their eyes. The Saudi’s are horrified. The Iranians are flabbergasated and suspicious… we’re handing over the entire region to them, there has to be a catch. The Europeans are simply embarrased that they even know us. The Chinese have quietly concluded that Americans are the stupidest people on the face of the earth and are acting accordingly…
Hilarious, but kind of embarrassing.
This seems to be one of those notions that gets embedded in American consciousness, so everyone goes around talking as if its true despite the evidence. Well, no sorry. There’s no magic diet that allows you to eat tons of junk food and not get fat. House prices do not go up endlessly forever. Service industry jobs are better than manufacturing. Abstinence education doesn’t work. And you really can get pregnant even if you’re standing up when you have sex.
But the part I like the most is that you can take one of these slack jawed retards, and you can present all the facts to them, let them stare at it with their dim piggy little eyes, and it even looks like they’re thinking it over. Then after a while, they just come out with this mean little mumble… “the surge worked.”
ROTFL
January 6th, 2009 at 4:00 pm
“Meanwhile, Thailand has decided to bomb Cambodia at will, and we can’t do more than whine about it.”
I like the analogy, but the reality wasn’t much different. The difference was that we bombed Cambodia at will, and the Thai could do nothing but whine about it. And they really didn’t whine too much. His Majesty was skeptical about the bombings, but was more than happy to have lots of US soldiers spending lots of money in his country. And the sex industry was thrilled by it.
January 6th, 2009 at 4:16 pm
Adjustments had to be made. Obviously, we’re not the ones bombing the Kurds at will. That’s the Turks.
As for Vietnam, well, all I can say is that it’s just as well America finally threw in the towel, gave up and went home, or we would have been losing Thailand to the communists as well.
January 7th, 2009 at 12:00 am
Hate to be the glass-half-empty type, but that’s still 25% of Shiites and 50% of Sunni who identify with their sect rather than their country. How many does it take to wreck a nation?
January 7th, 2009 at 2:26 pm
I still don’t understand why they don’t just re-install the Iraqi King. In those sorts of situations having a monarchy as a unifying figure with which different sects can identify, can be very useful. Belgium, for one, would have fallen apart long ago had it not been for the House of Saxe-Coburg und Gotha.
January 7th, 2009 at 5:12 pm
Well, as I recall, the Hashemites were installed as the ‘official royalty’ of Iraq in 1921, by the British who conquered Iraq and threw out the ruling Ottoman Empire in 1917.
King Faisal 1 had no particular connection to Iraq, he was simply an Ottoman Arab politician who ended up supporting the British. He was briefly King of Syria for a time, in 1921, before parachuting into Iraq. He ruled until 1933. For most of his reign, his country was a protectorate of Britain (until 1932).
After 1932, Iraq was nominally independent, but still under the control of Britain. Ghazi, the next king, was killed in an accident six years after taking the throne, 1933 to 1939.
His successor, Faisal II, ruled from 1939 to 1958. He was three years old in 1939, and so there was a regency rule until 1953 by his uncle, Abd al-lah.
The regency was interrupted in 1941 by an Army revolt. The Monarchy was overthrown completely in 1958.
The Iraqi monarchy lasted a mere 37 years, through three rulers and one regent, almost all under foreign control. The rules were short and unimpressive, they had no real impact on Iraqi society and had no roots within that society. It’s been fifty years since Iraq has had a king. They don’t really want one.
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