The Sons of Afghanistan
Dexter Filkins reports on an emerging strategy in Afghanistan to adopt an analog of the “sons of Iraq” militia-recruitment efforts. Spencer Ackerman expresses some considerable skepticism about this.
I’m relatively sanguine. I’ve always thought — and continue to think — that our post-surge tactics in Iraq have been wildly unsuited to our nominal war aims and to our interests in the region. I think those tactics have “succeeded” by redefining our war aims to something like “save face irrespective of the financial, human, or strategic costs.” But in Afghanistan, I think this makes more sense. In Afghanistan, fighting al-Qaeda really is the overarching goal. Afghanistan has no real tradition of effective central government control. And since Afghanistan doesn’t have the same resource curse issues as Iraq, I think it’s much more plausible to imagine a modus vivendi between disparate armed factions being somewhat stable over time.
25 Responses to “The Sons of Afghanistan”
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December 24th, 2008 at 1:46 pm
Put me in the camp of people who, for whatever reason, have real concerns over Afghanistan becoming an even larger cluster-* than Iraq.
Let’s assume we don’t go into Iraq in the first place. I think there’s a very good chance we’re still in Afghanistan in 2008. That place has never-ending-conflict written all over it. No thanks. We need a strategy that incorporates a healthy dose of getting the fuck out.
December 24th, 2008 at 1:55 pm
Anyone who thinks about Afghanistan strategy ought to read Rudyard Kipling’s 1888 short story The Man Who Would Be King, or at least watch the well-done film version with Sean Connery and Michael Caine.
Initial success and confidence leading to hubris and disaster down the road.
December 24th, 2008 at 2:00 pm
i wonder if “sanguine” is really the mot juste.
a “a modus vivendi between disparate armed factions” is also a way of saying “medieval conditions, no education, increasingly radical islamisation, the utter subjugation of women, appalling health care, etc. etc.”
now, maybe our presence can only make things worse, in which case we should get the fuck out, pronto.
but…sanguine. un uh.
December 24th, 2008 at 2:05 pm
I think those tactics have “succeeded” by redefining our war aims to something like “save face irrespective of the financial, human, or strategic costs.”
From the point of view of public relations, yeah. As practical matter, you have to leave somehow, so that kind of leaving beats not leaving.
In Afghanistan, fighting al-Qaeda really is the overarching goal. Afghanistan has no real tradition of effective central government control.
I agree that fighting al-Qaeda really is the goal, but a surge won’t even allow you to save face. The point from me is that Afghanistan IS like Iraq, but even worse. Iraq is a state riven by ethnic rivalries – and keeping the lid on those rivalries and holding the state together required a vicious dictatorship. As it stands, Iraq is going to half fall apart, half become a religious dictatorship. That’s fine from the strategic point of view since we never had any real strategic problem because of Iraq, so having it fall apart is six of one, half a dozen of the other. Our big strategic problem there is not Iraq itself, but the fact that the army was bogged down there.
Our big strategic problem in Central Asia was (and is) the fact that a nuclear armed state was propping up a religious dictatorship in a neighboring country and that dictatorship’s willingness to host an asshole who attacked us. Since bin Laden isn’t in Afghanistan, that strategic problem has shifted away to Pakistan. In Afghanistan the problem is is that no one has EVER glued that country together the way Saddam put together Iraq, and the closet contenders for the title were the Communists, the Russians and the Taliban, in that order. None of them ever actually succeeded. Instead small fiefdoms ruled by warlords has been the rule of the day and it is still the rule of the day.
In that context, encouraging militias is essentially conceding the breakup of the country – but we could just as easily cut a deal with the Taliban. In either case tho, the central government that we’re backing is roadkill. And having the Taliban in, or having the warlords in doesn’t solve the problem of bin Laden since the fucker isn’t even in that country. All surging will do in that case is secure the local fiefdom of Kabul, making it just one more warlord state.
If I were trying to solve the problem (which problem?) of trying to keep bin Laden out and minimizing the violence, I would totally go off the UN/NATO map. Tell the Tajik government to take the Tajik areas of Afghanistan, do the same with the Uzbecs, encourage the Hazara to make themselves a nation and cut a deal with the Taliban to take over/unite the Pashtun regions. And then get our asses out of there before the Pakis cut our supply lines. We would then watch and wait for another shot at bin Laden and probably deals some weapons and cash to our various pals in areas that were formerly part of Afghanistan.
If Pakistan comes apart, we will get another shot at bin Laden. If he moves back into Afghanistan, then we get another shot at him. If he kicks it, fine, then we just forget the entire sorry episode. But you gotta lure the SOB out into the open if he ain’t dead.
max
['Fixing Pakistan is close to impossible.']
December 24th, 2008 at 2:07 pm
Here is my strategy for Afghanistan:
Get the fuck out of Afghanistan!
If some terrorist bad guys reconstitute a training base, we can send in a bomber or a special ops hit team to blow it up. That’s the extent of our business there. Otherwise, leave that rugged and outlaw land in the graveyard of empires to its own people.
Merry Christmas.
December 24th, 2008 at 2:31 pm
Afghanistan is the largest opium producer in the world. According to the UN, 93% of the opiates on the world market originate in Afghanistan. It should be obvious that the issue of opium income precludes the success of any purely military solution in Afghanistan.
It goes without saying that the overwhelming bulk of opium income goes directly to the kingpins or drug lords at the top of the pyramid. Nevertheless the farmers in Afghanistan who actually grow and harvest poppies are currently supporting themselves via this “cash crop”. Unless we are able to introduce an alternative income means, they will face the choice of starvation or continuing to grow poppies.
As to the local drug lords, it is apparent that they stand to lose a great deal of money — They could decide to just give it all up and become poor peasants, or they could invest a great deal of money in weapons, and imported soldiers, if necessary, to maintain the status quo.
So what is the plan for dealing with these issues? As far as I know, we have none. We send soldiers to secure “peace”; they fight; and the status quo remains the same.
There is no military solution to opium production in Afghanistan because its not a military problem. But there is no solution that can provide a lasting and stable government in Afghanistan without addressing opium production.
We’re running on a hamster wheel. We run, the wheel rotates… But we’re definitely making progress. Just look how fast that thing is spinning!
December 24th, 2008 at 2:44 pm
“But in Afghanistan, I think this makes more sense. In Afghanistan, fighting al-Qaeda really is the overarching goal.”
Are the Americans and what’s left of the NATO forces fighting al-Qaeda anymore in Afghanistan? Aren’t they just fighting whoever won’t accept the Karzai government or wants to disrupt that government? In other words, mainly the Taliban, and various other outfits.
Suppose you want to go recruit the “Sons of Afghanistan.” Who do you tell them they’re going to fight, and why? Just because every bearded dude with a turban and a gun looks al-Qaeda to you, it doesn’t mean he looks like al-Qaeda to an Afghan. If on the other hand you tell them they’re going to fight the Taliban, wouldn’t that end up just being a big non-Pashtuns vs. Pahstun war? What’s the point of that?
Is there any point?
December 24th, 2008 at 3:30 pm
Afghanistan is the largest opium producer in the world.
Make them the 51st state. Tax opium sales.
December 24th, 2008 at 3:37 pm
I was one of those evil folks who thought that the invasion of Afghanistan was also a bad idea. Yes, it hosted an evil government bent on destroying their own nation, subjugation of women, and unable to stem the tide of opiates coming from there. All good reasons to do away with it. But that wasn’t the reason we were going to go. We were going for revenge (didn’t that government offer a deal to hand over bin Laden?). Military adventurism based on revenge fantasies isn’t viable.
Afghanistan needed something much farther reaching than a childish shoot-em-up. It would have involved killing, and while I’m opposed to killing people there are times when not killing people is worse. This could have been one of them. But. For this to work we need to make a concerted effort to start from the ground up. We needed people dedicated to nation building. We needed adults in charge of the whole thing. We had Bush.
December 24th, 2008 at 3:46 pm
Forget about the pipeline. Screw Bechtel. Get out.
December 24th, 2008 at 8:17 pm
Out and way out and fast. It’s over. Mullah Omar and the neo-Taliban have won. The Brits and everyone else except ‘08-’09’s version of The Best and the Brightest know it.
December 24th, 2008 at 8:47 pm
Matt: Is killing present al-Qaeda members our overarching goal, or is preventing Afghanistan from becoming another safe-haven for terrorists our overarching goal?
We are absolutely correct to want to strengthen the power of local security rather than relying on a centralized, corrupt national government in Kabul. But arming these militias is sidestepping the problem. Instead of making local government in Afghanistan more accountable to constituents, we are setting up the seeds for conflict when we leave. We are creating a system of militias accountable only to foreign sponsors in parallel to a government that is powerful only in name.
Warlordism and an anarchic distribution of power helped bring about the rise of the Taliban in the first place – various armed groups did not find a modus vivendi after the Soviets left. You are correct to point out we can’t rely on a central government. But the system we are creating now will need constant American management to prevent internal strife or worse. Improving local security has to come with improving local governance. Separate the two, and you will leave a lot of people with guns and grievances up against a corrupt, inept government. Unless we solve the governance problem, such a system will explode not long after ISAF leaves, if not sooner.
December 24th, 2008 at 10:49 pm
Another moronic post from Matt, who knows nothing about Afghanistan, or the differences between the Taliban (not to mention the “old” Taliban and the “new” Taliban) and “Al Qaeda”.
And there’s no such things as “solving the governance problem”. What the hell does that even MEAN? There IS NO government in Afghanistan and there never has been. Before the Russian invasion, there was a more or less Marxist government in place. It wasn’t successful, but it was better off than the corrupt lackeys the US put in place. But having that government in place did nothing to help the Russians.
Karzai’s brother is a frickin’ drug dealer, for Christ’s sakes! Karzai himself needs 600 US mercenaries to keep his ass alive!
And Matt’s notion that somehow the US military or US diplomats – who doesn’t understand all this crap, either – can possibly sort out the various arguments between factions in Afghanistan, and somehow balance that all off to a degree preventing any resurgence of Al Qaeda – which is operating out of Pakistan now, in any event! – is just complete nonsense.
And how are you going to DO that by dumping another 30,000, 40,000, 60,000 troops into the country to AGGRAVATE the dislike the Pashtun and other groups have for foreign occupation? As the Taliban have already said about Obama’s “surge”: “Just more targets.”
This is a content-free post from Matt which is just aimless speculation.
Try this, from someone who’s been there, embedded with the Taliban:
Back from Afghanistan, Journalist Nir Rosen Says Taliban Takeover Looks “Irreversible”
http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/103301/back_from_afghanistan,_journalist_nir_rosen_says_taliban_takeover_looks_%22irreversible%22/?page=entire
December 25th, 2008 at 2:32 am
There is no military solution to opium production in Afghanistan because its not a military problem. But there is no solution that can provide a lasting and stable government in Afghanistan without addressing opium production.
Yep. Buy up the entire opium crop.
I’m one of those who thinks that the “fucked up in the execution” line used by liberal hawks towards Iraq applies better to Afghanistan. I also think that Afghanistan’s reputation as the graveyard of empires is well-earned.
RSH is right to say that Afghanistan was relatively stable in the mid -70s under Daoud Khan, but that preceded the breakup of the USSR. That divided up the northern border into other -stans, which creates ethnic outward tensions. Not that Uzbekistan wants Rashid Dostum, or Tajikistan Rezvon Sadirov,
An ‘Anbar Awakening’ strategy in Afghanistan is, in practice, no more than rent-a-warlord. Which is no different from what was done at the end of 2001. Now, you can try to succeed as the biggest warlord of all, but that involves sending a million people to become Afghans. As in, for keeps. If you don’t plan on staying, don’t plan on being there unless you’re keeping a warlord happy.
December 25th, 2008 at 7:09 pm
Attack the entire problem from behind. End the war on drugs – Legalise opiates, and let the pharmacies sell them over the counter at cost, and the entire distribution chain for illigal drugs will collapse overnight because the underground economy cannot make money on drugs that sells for pocket change and suddenly afghan warlords have no income whatsoever anymore. Nor does any number of other asshat warlords in various corners of the world.
As a side effect, it should drastically lower crime rates (a very large percentage of all crimes-against-property are commited by junkies trying to raise cash for their habit. dirt cheap drugs will make them steal less)
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