Aug 12th, 2008 at 9:04 am

Noah Millman surveys the mainstream conservative response and correctly concludes that the right’s approach to bluffing doesn’t inspire a ton of confidence. He glosses their logic thusly:
- Russia has called our bluff and dared us to make good on any implicit promises to Georgia that we would protect Georgian territorial integrity.
- Our bluff having been called, we now have no good options, as we have no real points of leverage to force Russia out, and no credibility as an honest broker between the Russians and the Georgians. Any cease-fire will probably take place on Russian terms, and the Georgians will know not to rely on the West to protect them. This lesson will, presumably, be well-learned by other small countries inclined to rely on American protection against large and dangerous adversaries. So even if this war ends non-disastrously for ordinary Georgians, it’s bad for us.
- Therefore, we should have bluffed harder, going all-in with an explicit guarantee, because if we had done that Russia wouldn’t have dared call our bluff, but would have backed down and allowed Georgia to retake South Ossetia by force.
This kind of thinking is, of course, both crazy and also apparently good enough to get you a column in a major national newspaper.
Photo by Flickr user Jamadams used under a Creative Commons license
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August 12th, 2008 at 9:12 am
And McCain still wants to nuke Putin…
http://www.political-buzz.com/
August 12th, 2008 at 9:14 am
I wonder, though, whether conservatives’ real goal is domestic backstabbing and SchadenHitler-izing. I mean, do you think that Bill Kristol really gives a shit about the Georgians?
August 12th, 2008 at 9:17 am
These are the kind of people who called for the forcible rollback of Soviet power during the Cold War, including offering significant material support to the Berlin uprising of 1953 and the Hungarian rebellion in 1956. For the record, Eisenhower thought those people were infantile and never considered acting on their advice. Imagine that: a conservative who took the limitations on American power into account. You’d think the Iraq experience would underscore the importance of prudence and restraint, but–for some people–flexing muscles and braying in the field feels too good to resist.
August 12th, 2008 at 9:34 am
I agree with the overall thinking here, but isn’t point 3 essentially what we have done with China and Taiwan? So far it seems to have worked.
August 12th, 2008 at 9:38 am
Re #4 - while I think that our guarantee to Taiwan is dangerously stupid, in that case there are a number of things we really could do to help it if China attacks (hint: Taiwan is on an Island and we have by far the worlds strongest navy). (Not that we should, IMO, take those measures if Taiwan is attacked.)
August 12th, 2008 at 9:41 am
How is a supposed implicit promise to Georgia a bluff? Isn’t a bluff, in this context, an explicit threat to Russia? I haven’t seen evidence of a bluff.
It also seems relevant that Barry has endorsed a form of explicit guarantee with his call for a Nato membership action plan for Georgia. I’m sure Matt thinks that’s not crazy and qualifies Barry for the presidency.
August 12th, 2008 at 9:59 am
The US has huge non-military options that can severely hurt China. Yes it would also be painful for the US, but a huge jump up in tariffs would mean a problems for China. The US does not have that leverage with Russia.
August 12th, 2008 at 9:59 am
Thomas,
Go see Booman about the ‘consensus talk’ Obama has to repeat in order to stay eligible for election to the presidency.
What I am looking forward to is January 21st when a Democratic President in office can start the process of making rational foreign policy acceptable again. America has been in fantasy land long enough.
By the way, this Georgia episode has been very infromative. Vote McCain, get Cheney. Scary stuff. Everybody up for a big land war in Russia?
August 12th, 2008 at 10:06 am
Right, every failure of neocon policy is evidence in their eyes of the need to listen to them even more.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:07 am
Bluff harder? No, but we should have extended NATO membership to Georgia earlier. Russia would not have crossed the border into South Ossetia if Georgia had NATO membership. The Russian military isn’t one-third as capable today as it was 17 years ago. NATO would have a decisive air superiority advantage. Russia fears a conflict with NATO as much as NATO member states fear a conflict with Russia.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:16 am
Unilateralism sure is fun when someone else is doing it, isn’t it?
Georgia’s toast. Stop whining and get used to it.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:19 am
Russia would not have crossed the border into South Ossetia if Georgia had NATO membership.
Alternatively, Russia would (correctly) assume that no such thing as you are imagining would happen over a backwater, breakaway province in Georgia and NATO disolves into a relic of the 20th century.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:21 am
The US has huge non-military options that can severely hurt China. Yes it would also be painful for the US, but a huge jump up in tariffs would mean a problems for China.
Well, if it came to it I think the US would rationally let Taiwan go rather than destroy its economy, which is what a war with China would entail. Our trade relations are too deep and central to our economy to disrupt.
The good news, which is what you point out, is this cuts both ways, and China’s economy is too dependent on the US to even risk such retaliation. As long as Taiwan isn’t actively causing political unrest on the mainland, China should be happy with the status quo.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:22 am
Spackler,
Of course NATO’s Membership Action Plan for Georgia almost surely would have required Georgia to satisfy NATO it had no intention of doing something like trying to invade South Ossetia. That’s the thing people often seem to miss about joining NATO–NATO isn’t interested in providing unconditional pledges of support to unreliable partners, so prospective members have to meet all sorts of conditions designed to make sure that the countries joining NATO would be helpful and not harmful to NATO’s existing members.
August 12th, 2008 at 10:37 am
DTM,
There’s a bit of a chicken-egg problem in Georgia’s case. There’s ample evidence that Georgia’s “invasion” of South Ossetia and the escalation thereafter was provoked by Russia. Yes, Georgia has been very chesty vis-a-vis Russia, but it’s in substantial part because Russia keeps poking it.
August 12th, 2008 at 11:00 am
Let’s approach the Georgia-NATO possibilities as a cost-benefit analysis (”realism”, as it were).
If Georgia isn’t in NATO, Russia invades, and Russia learns that it can control the weakest of its former SSRs. BP loses a lot of money; little else happens.
If Georgia is in NATO, and Russia declines to respond to Georgian aggression, Russia still tries to control its other SSRs. BP keeps its money.
If Georgia is in NATO, and Russia decides to respond to Georgian aggression, we have World War III and the global economy, developed since World War II, is annihilated.
So, since the worst case scenario of exclusion from NATO is that 1 company loses some money–and BP would lose plenty during World War III–it seems completely prudent–”realist”, as it were–to exclude weak former SSRs from NATO.
August 12th, 2008 at 11:14 am
Spackler,
The sorts of possible staged events in South Ossetia described in that article are not what actually happened–Georgia did in fact invade South Ossetia and attempt to take the capital. So while it may be true the Russians wanted to stage an excuse for stepped up military action in the area, the Georgians handed Russia a real opportunity by actually invading.
Luke,
Again, part of what your analysis is missing is that a NATO MAP for Georgia would undoubtedly be designed to minimize the risk of a military conflict over South Ossetia in the first place. So you are missing a fourth possibility, something like:
Georgia is in NATO, Georgia doesn’t invade South Ossetia, Russia doesn’t invade Georgia, and peace is preserved.
August 12th, 2008 at 12:08 pm
The obvious question, if Georgia were to be admitted to NATO, is whether NATO really would go to war with the Russians over the question of South Ossetia.
Frankly, I’m guessing the answer is “no.” War is the continuation of politics, and politics is the art of the possible. I’m guessing the member states would scrap the alliance rather than allow Georgia to start World War III.
And that, in a nutshell, is the argument against a new round of NATO expansion at present. If Russian tanks rolled into Poland, I could see the West being willing to go to war. Tblisi? Not so much.
August 12th, 2008 at 1:23 pm
I’d be willing to wager that the radar installation in the Czech Republic is already gone; perhaps that’s why the Russians have halted troop movements.
August 12th, 2008 at 1:27 pm
We have a much longer history with Taiwan than Georgia. In addition, we officially recognize the PRC as the real China and Taiwan as part of China, thus partially giving China what it wants enough to save some face while not conceding the greater point. Japan and Korea, other major allies, are also pretty much completely dependent on the Taiwan Strait remaining open for trade. Both Beijing and DC have learned how to maintain a stable status quo. Even Bush told Chen Shui-bian to knock it off when Chen wanted to declare formal independence and told Chen that he wouldn’t necessarily be able to count on the US if he did that and China retaliated. Taiwan is also fully in control of its own territory, but Georgia has failed to practice de facto control of three areas of their country.
August 12th, 2008 at 2:06 pm
You’re right, DTM. At the same time, the value of being in NATO is greatly diminished if these small former SSRs are required to concede their primary disputes with Russia ahead of time.
So, I guess what I support would be a massive meaningless expansion of NATO, wherein we say “Here’s your mutual defense pact. If the main thing that would cause an invasion does cause you to be invaded, you’re on your own. However, if something unexpected comes up, we’ll protect you.”
It’s actually very similar to being a vassal state to Tsarist Russia.
August 12th, 2008 at 2:41 pm
Luke,
Well, Georgia would still be allowed to deal with South Ossetia through non-military means, but yes, NATO generally drives a hard bargain for new members. Which is understandable, since in terms of things like contributing to combined military efforts, a country like Georgia wouldn’t have a lot to offer the current members (although Ukraine more so), so NATO is in the superior bargaining position. That said, part of the deal is that NATO probably would in fact defend its new members from an unprovoked invasion by Russia, which may not be particularly likely, but that may also be insurance worth having.